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Where Is Home? The Challenge of
Finding Safe Housing Via Early Lease
Termination for Victims of Domestic
Violence
Charlotte Gerchick*
Abstract
This Note addresses the legal recourse of domestic violence
victims who are attempting to terminate a lease early for the
purpose of escaping domestic violence at home. In March 2013,
President Barack Obama signed the reauthorization of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA). This version of the Act includes Title
VI, which protects victims of domestic violence and stalking. Title
VI applies to federally subsidized housing. It allows domestic
violence victims to terminate a lease early for the purpose of
removing themselves from an abusive household. Title VI also
makes it illegal to deny or terminate housing assistance based on
an individual’s status as a victim of domestic violence, dating
violence, sexual assault, or stalking. Even with federal legislation
in place, domestic violence victims in nearly half of the United
States cannot terminate leases early for the purpose of escaping
abuse because their leases are private and therefore not subject to
the federal law. In response to this barrier, some states are enacting
laws that allow victims to terminate their private leases early. The
various state statutes are inconsistent with one another, however.
Therefore, some statutes protect victims more thoroughly than
others. The inconsistencies may confuse individuals about what
protections various statutes actually offer. This Note includes a
model universal statute that addresses gaps in victim protection
and clarifies which rights victimized tenants should have.
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I. Introduction

A. The Case of Caren Burnett
On June 3, 2010, Mrs. Caren Burnett filed a petition in Florida
for a domestic violence civil protection order (CPO) against her
husband, Mr. Alan Burnett.1 The purpose of the CPO was to
protect Mrs. Burnett and her three minor children from Mr.
Burnett.2 During the process of filing a petition to receive the CPO,
Mrs. Burnett alleged that for seven years her husband repeatedly
threatened to kill her in a variety of ways.3 After briefly detailing
the threats to a judge and affirming she was in fear for her safety
and well-being, the court granted Mrs. Burnett a temporary ex
parte CPO.4 Additionally, the court assigned a future court date at
which Mrs. Burnett and her husband could address the allegations
in a fully adjudicated hearing, potentially extending the lifetime of
the CPO for up to a year.5
During the hearing, Mrs. Burnett testified about Mr. Burnett’s
infliction of emotional abuse, noting that incidences of abuse
occurred in Florida, Ohio, and Michigan.6 Mrs. Burnett testified
that her husband had devised a “wood-chipper” plan, “indicating
that he could shoot a wood-chipper’s contents into a lake and then
dump bleach into it to get rid of the evidence.”7 The implication
was that the “contents” would be Mrs. Burnett’s remains.8 In
addition to specific murder plans, Mr. Burnett also made more
1. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. June
15, 2012) (“On June 3, 2010, appellee filed a petition for a domestic violence CPO
in the court below, pursuant to R.C. 3113.31.”).
2. See id. (“Through the petition, appellee sought protection for herself and
the three children.”).
3. See id. (“She alleged that over the course of seven years, appellant had
threatened her with death by means of a handgun or wood chipper if she ever left
him.”).
4. See id. (“Following an ex parte hearing on the same day, the lower court
issued an ex parte domestic violence CPO, naming appellee and the parties’ three
minor children as protected persons.”).
5. See id. (“The court further ordered that the case proceed to a full hearing
before the lower court magistrate.”).
6. See id. (describing Mr. Burnett’s interest in handguns while in Florida
and, later, threats to kill Mrs. Burnett in Ohio and Michigan).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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generalized death threats toward Mrs. Burnett involving their
children.9
In an attempt to escape her husband’s abuse, Mrs. Burnett
took a risk and strategically removed her children from the home.10
Mrs. Burnett moved to Ohio without Mr. Burnett’s knowledge.11
Mr. Burnett thought Mrs. Burnett planned to live in Florida with
him because they had signed a lease together.12 However, Mrs.
Burnett actually intended to leave her husband.13 She signed the
lease out of fear of her husband’s retaliation if he knew she wanted
to leave.14 Mrs. Burnett testified that “on the same day [she and
her husband signed a lease], outside the presence of [her husband],
she initialed a document pertaining to the termination of the lease;
she also secured a storage unit and . . . shipped back all of her
materials for her business.”15 While planning the move to Ohio,
Mrs. Burnett contacted an Ohio legal aid office to help her find a
way to get out of her lease in Florida, find a new place to live in
Ohio, and find schools and doctors for her children.16 After
considering all of the evidence, the trial court concluded Mrs.
Burnett and her children should be granted a permanent domestic
violence CPO, providing them with protection from Mr. Burnett for
a full year.17 Mrs. Burnett was able to leave her husband and move

9. See id. (quoting her husband as saying, “If you leave me, I’ll kill you and
then I’ll go to jail and the kids will have to stay with my parents”).
10. See id. (detailing how Mrs. Burnett tried to leave her husband without
his knowledge).
11. See id. (“[Mrs. Burnett] admitted that she went to Florida with [Mr.
Burnett] but that she never intended to remain there. She went because appellant
took their oldest two children in the moving van with him.”).
12. See id. (describing Mrs. Burnett’s experience).
13. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-12-041, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
22, 2013) (revealing via testimony exactly how Mrs. Burnett tried to escape the
abuse).
14. See id. (noting why Mrs. Burnett signed a lease with her husband).
15. Id.
16. See id. (“[Mrs. Burnett] testified that while in Florida, she made several
calls to an Ohio legal aid office. [She] also stated that during that time she was
making calls to set up where she and the boys would live, and making inquiries
as to schools, dentists, and doctors.”).
17. See id. (“Accordingly, the [trial] court issued a full civil protection order
against appellant for a period of one year. In that order, the court named [Mrs.
Burnett] and [her] three children as protected persons.”).
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to Ohio.18 While Mr. Burnett continued to harass Mrs. Burnett by
including her name in legal proceedings for various claims, she was
at least able to successfully terminate the lease and move to a safer
place with her children.19 She was fortunate.
Mrs. Burnett’s story—a woman with children trying to leave
an abusive husband—exemplifies the experience of thousands of
women and children in the United States.20 In fact, one in four
women will be a victim of severe domestic violence by a partner in
her lifetime.21 When leaving her husband to protect her children,
Mrs. Burnett was burdened by the need to leave an existing home
and find a new one.22 Housing is a major concern of those who try
to escape domestic violence.23 The existing law does not make the
process of leaving easy, resulting in a high likelihood of
homelessness.24
Several states have begun to legally address the difficulty
many domestic violence victims face when trying to escape an
abuser with whom they live.25 Some states have adopted statutory
provisions that allow victims to terminate their leases early

18. See id. (sharing that Mrs. Burnett was able to leave Florida).
19. See id. (addressing other cases the Burnetts were involved in).
20. See Alanna Vagianos, 30 Shocking Domestic Violence Statistics that
Remind
Us
It’s
an
Epidemic,
HUFFPOST
(Dec.
6,
2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/23/domestic-violencestatistics_n_5959776.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (noting that ten million
children are exposed to domestic violence every year) [https://perma.cc/U3NBWF9X].
21. See id. (sharing statistics from 2017).
22. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
22, 2013) (addressing the ways Mrs. Burnett tried to remove herself and her
children from Mr. Burnett’s abuse).
23. See Vagianos, supra note 20 (addressing the prevalence of homelessness
among victims of domestic violence).
24. See Domestic Violence and Homelessness, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END
HOMELESSNESS,
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/whatcauses-homelessness/domestic-violence/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“On a single
night in 2017, homeless services providers had more than 55,000 beds set aside
for survivors of domestic violence.”) [https://perma.cc/4VHS-ZQ84].
25. See State Laws Protecting Tenants in Domestic Violence Situations,
NOLO
(Nov.
2017),
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-lawsprotecting-tenants-in-domestic-violence-situations.html (last visited Nov. 28,
2019) [hereinafter State Laws] (identifying states having early lease termination
statutes for domestic violence victims) [https://perma.cc/HC66-HZR7].
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without penalty of consequence or discrimination when attempting
to find a new home.26
Had Mrs. Burnett lived in Georgia, for example, she could
have provided notice to her landlord that she needed to terminate
her lease early, provided a police report and an ex parte temporary
CPO, and then would have been able to terminate the lease
without consequence.27 Many states do not allow early lease
termination with only an ex parte temporary CPO, however, and
require a copy of a permanent CPO to terminate a lease early.28
As another example, in Colorado, in addition to the ability to
terminate a lease early, Mrs. Burnett would have been able to
receive a referral letter from her former landlord whose lease she
had terminated without fearing discrimination by a new landlord
due to her status as a victim or fearing that her previous landlord
could disclose her status.29 Mrs. Burnett was lucky, but other
victims continue to suffer, as neither Ohio nor Florida have any
state statutes permitting early lease termination for domestic
violence victims.30
In Mrs. Burnett’s case, all she could do was hope the Florida
landlord would release her from the existing lease without
consequence and hope to receive a new lease in Ohio without the
Florida landlord disclosing why she left or warning against her as
a tenant.31 Sadly, many women in the United States are
unsuccessful when attempting to escape domestic violence.32 Many
26. See id. (noting the different provisions that states have).
27. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-23 (2018) (“The notice to the landlord pursuant
to subsection (b) of this Code section shall be accompanied by a copy of the
applicable civil family violence order or criminal family violence order and a copy
of the police report if such order was an ex parte temporary protective order.”).
28. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6 (West 2008) (noting that a domestic
violence victim may terminate a lease early with “a certified copy of a permanent
restraining order”).
29. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (clarifying that when
a domestic violence victim terminates a lease early the “landlord shall not disclose
such fact to any person except with the consent of the victim”).
30. See State Laws, supra note 25 (indicating that neither state has statutes
regarding early lease termination for domestic violence victims).
31. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
22, 2013) (describing how Mrs. Burnett made arrangements to move to Ohio on
the same day that she signed the lease in Florida).
32. See Vagianos, supra note 20 (noting that 18,000 women have been killed
by men because of domestic violence since 2003).
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are hindered in their efforts to leave because landlords reject early
lease termination efforts, discriminate against victims, or apply
various penalties to those who abandon existing leases.33
This Note addresses the legal tools available to victims of
domestic violence when they wish to terminate a lease early in an
effort to escape an abuser.34 This Note also considers why the tools
currently available are insufficient to protect victims.35
B. Domestic Violence in America
1. Definitions and Forms of Abuse
“Domestic violence—also called intimate partner violence,
domestic abuse or relationship abuse—is a pattern of behaviors
executed by one partner to maintain power and control over
another partner in an intimate relationship.”36 Potentially, anyone
could become a victim of domestic violence because it affects all
genders, races, sexual orientations, socio-economic groups, and
ages.37 It is a common misconception that victims of domestic
violence only suffer physical abuse.38 While physical abuse is one
33. See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677 (D. Vt. 2005)
(demonstrating discriminatory actions by a landlord due to the tenant’s status as
a domestic abuse victim); see also Knudsen v. Lax, 842 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (Cty.
Ct. 2007) (penalizing a tenant who terminated his lease in order to move away
and protect his kids from a sex offender by withholding his security deposit);
Robinson v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 1:08-CV-238, 2008 WL 1924255,
at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2008) (refusing to transfer a victim of domestic violence
to another vacant unit in the complex so that she could escape her abuser).
34. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6 (West 2008) (noting that a domestic
violence victim may terminate a lease early with “a certified copy of a permanent
restraining order”).
35. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th
Cong. (2013) (providing protection from housing discrimination for female victims
of domestic violence, but only for federally subsidized housing).
36. Abuse
Defined,
NAT’L
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
HOTLINE,
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/ (last visited Nov. 28,
2019) [https://perma.cc/MAZ7-G72S].
37. See id. (“Domestic violence does not discriminate. Anyone of any race,
age, sexual orientation, religion or gender can be a victim—or perpetrator—of
domestic violence. It can happen to people who are married, living together or
who are dating. It affects people of all socioeconomic backgrounds and education
levels.”).
38. See id. (detailing the various types of abuse).
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form of domestic violence, psychological and emotional abuse are
also types of domestic violence.39 Often domestic violence begins as
psychological or emotional abuse but later escalates to physical
violence.40
Those who commit domestic violence do so to control their
partner, often due to their own insecurity.41 “Abusive people
believe they have the right to control and restrict their
partners . . . . They often believe that their own feelings and needs
should be the priority in their relationships.”42
There are various methods of abuse.43 Physical abuse can
include slapping, hitting with a closed fist, strangulation, and
physical restraint.44 Sexual violence is another form of physical
domestic violence.45 Emotional and psychological abuse typically
include “yelling, name-calling, blaming, and shaming,” and
threatening the victim with physical violence or death, as well as
efforts to isolate the victim from others.46
With the development of new technology, abusers have
discovered how to use devices and social media to perpetuate
abuse.47 As social media has gained popularity, perpetrators of
39. See id. (“Domestic violence includes behaviors that physically harm,
arouse fear, prevent a partner from doing what they wish or force them to behave
in ways they do not want. It includes the use of physical and sexual violence,
threats and intimidation, emotional abuse and economic deprivation.”).
40. See Melinda Smith & Jeanne Segal, Domestic Violence and Abuse,
HELPGUIDE.ORG (Sept. 2018), https://www.helpguide.org/articles/abuse/domesticviolence-and-abuse.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“Domestic abuse often
escalates from threats and verbal abuse to violence.”) [https://perma.cc/429BLTF2].
41. See Why Do People Abuse?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE,
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/why-do-people-abuse/ (last visited Nov.
28, 2019) (“Domestic violence and abuse stem from a desire to gain and maintain
power and control over an intimate partner.”) [https://perma.cc/7HK3-36CG].
42. Id.
43. See Smith & Segal, supra note 40 (explaining that there is physical,
emotional, and psychological abuse).
44. See Smith & Segal, supra note 40 (“Physical abuse is the use of physical
force against someone in a way that injures or endangers that person. Physical
assault or battering is a crime, whether it occurs inside or outside of the family.”).
45. See Smith & Segal, supra note 40 (“Any situation in which you are forced
to participate in unwanted, unsafe, or degrading sexual activity is sexual abuse.”).
46. Smith & Segal, supra note 40.
47. See Delanie Woodlock, The Abuse of Technology in Domestic Violence and
Stalking, 23 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 584, 584 (2017) (“[T]echnology—including
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domestic violence have begun to use various platforms to commit
abuse.48 For example, a perpetrator might post nude pictures of the
victim online in an effort to publicly shame the victim, harass a
victim’s friends and family on social media in an effort to gain the
victim’s attention, and publish derogatory messages about the
victim for the public to read.49 With the development of
smartphone applications and smart home devices, abusers have
been able to modernize their tactics further.50 For example, several
applications allow abusers to disguise their phone numbers,
allowing them to contact their victims from different numbers once
the victims have blocked their contact number.51 Additionally, this
allows perpetrators to remain anonymous, making it difficult for a
victim to convince a judge that the same person is calling from a
variety of numbers.52 Smart home applications have recently been
recognized as helping perpetrators abuse their victims.53 “[A]ir
phones, tablets, computers, and social networking websites—is commonly used in
intimate partner stalking.”).
48. See Interview with Domestic Violence Victim One, Client, Atlanta
Volunteer Lawyers Found., in Atlanta, Ga. (July 19, 2018) (explaining how her
abuser would harass her on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram by pestering her
friends and family so they would contact the victim on the perpetrator’s behalf);
see also Tech & Social Media Safety, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE,
https://www.thehotline.org/help/tech-social-media-safety/ (last visited Nov. 28,
2019) (detailing how perpetrators of domestic violence utilize social media)
[https://perma.cc/Y44Z-Y54E].
49. See Interview with Domestic Violence Victim One, supra note 48
(describing the various social media methods in which the perpetrator would
abuse the victim).
50. See Interview with Domestic Violence Victim Two, Client, Atlanta
Volunteer Lawyers Found., in Atlanta, Ga. (July 3, 2018) (explaining how her
abuser would use spoof apps to repeatedly change his phone number each time
she blocked him); see also Caller ID Spoofing 101: The Definitive Guide to Call
&
Text
Spoofing,
SPOOFCARD
(Nov.
30,
2017),
https://www.spoofcard.com/blog/caller-id-spoofing/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019)
[hereinafter Caller ID Spoofing 101] (explaining how the spoof app works)
[https://perma.cc/RP9B-38LT].
51. See Caller ID Spoofing 101, supra note 50 (“Caller ID spoofing services
. . . give you the power to communicate anonymously when you otherwise could
not.”).
52. See Interview with Joel Correa, Staff Attorney, Atlanta Volunteer
Lawyers Found., in Atlanta, Ga. (July 20, 2018) (explaining how the law has yet
to catch up with advancements in technology).
53. See Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of
Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2018, at A1 (identifying the various ways
abusers have used technology to target victims).
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conditioners, doorbells, and so many other household items are
able to be controlled remotely, making them prime targets for
driving a partner crazy—or at least making them feel that way.”54
For example, one victim described “thermostats suddenly turning
themselves up to 100 degrees or smart speakers suddenly blasting
music.”55 These are all methods to control and exert power over a
victim.56
2. Domestic Violence Today
Millions of individuals in the United States qualify for a
protective order.57 “1 in 3 women and 1 in 4 men have been victims
of [some form of] physical violence by an intimate partner within
their lifetime.”58 While both men and women are victims of
domestic violence, statistics reveal that more women than men are
victimized.59 “The number of American women who were murdered
by current or ex male partners [between 2001 and 2012] was
11,766.60 That is nearly double the number of American casualties
lost during [the War on Terror].”61 Indeed, 6488 American troops
were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2012.62

54. Wendy L. Patrick, Remote Controlled: Domestic Abuse Through
Technology,
PSYCHOL.
TODAY
(July
22,
2018),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/why-bad-looks-good/201807/remotecontrolled-domestic-abuse-through-technology?amp (last visited Nov. 28, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/4D3W-CZCU].
55. Id.
56. See id. (“Abusive relationships are about power and control, and [the
abuser] uses technology.”).
57. See Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://ncadv.org/statistics (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“On average, nearly 20
people per minute are physically abused by an intimate partner in the United
States. During one year, this equates to more than 10 million women and men.”)
[https://perma.cc/Y7RW-9R45].
58. Id.
59. See id. (“Women are much more likely to be victims of intimate partner
violence with 85 percent of domestic abuse victims being women and 15 percent
men.”).
60. Vagianos, supra note 20.
61. Vagianos, supra note 20.
62. Vagianos, supra note 20.
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With such a high number of domestic violence victims in
America, many victims try to avoid becoming a murder statistic by
moving away from their abusers.63 Removing oneself from an
abusive situation is not always simple because many victims
cannot financially afford to leave, do not want to live in a shelter
with their children, or do not know of a safe place to go.64 “Domestic
and sexual violence is a primary cause, and consequence, of
homelessness and housing instability for women and girls.”65 Many
women who are abused by an intimate partner are financially
unstable but feel that their lives are so at risk that they must leave,
many times becoming homeless.66 Housing often becomes a major
concern of those who suffer domestic violence because many
victims who decide to move away from their abuser must face the
challenges of finding new housing and leaving their current
home.67
Victims endure discriminatory challenges from various
sources when trying to establish safe homes.68 Often landlords
evict victims who create disturbances during the abuse or deny
63. See Melissa Davey, The Most Dangerous Time, THE GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/society/ng-interactive/2015/jun/02/domesticviolence-five-women-tell-their-stories-of-leaving-the-most-dangerous-time (last
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (detailing the various ways and reasons why women have
worked to escape domestically violent situations) [https://perma.cc/LAR9-4F23].
64. See Susan Johnson Taylor, 5 Financial Challenges Facing Survivors of
Domestic Abuse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 26, 2018, 10:24 AM),
https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2016-10-26/5financial-challenges-facing-survivors-of-domestic-abuse (last visited Nov. 28,
2019) (explaining the financial difficulty regarding housing when victims try to
leave a domestically violent situation) [https://perma.cc/3Z7F-CB7Y].
65. See A General Overview of Disparate Impact Theory: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113 Cong.
1 (2013) (reporting that nearly a fifth of cities surveyed in 2011 cited domestic
violence as one of the three main causes of family homelessness).
66. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12471 (2012) (finding that an estimated ninety-two
percent of homeless mothers have experienced severe physical and/or sexual
assault, that sixty percent of all homeless women and children have been abused
by age twelve, and that sixty-three percent have been victims of intimate partner
violence as adults).
67. See Taylor, supra note 64 (detailing the financial challenges that
domestic violence victims face).
68. See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21,
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 7405733 (“Discriminatory housing
policies contribute to and exacerbate the housing crisis faced by victims.”).
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housing to anyone who is a victim of domestic violence.69 On the
other hand, landlords often refuse to allow domestic violence
victims to terminate their leases, which forces the victim to remain
in violent circumstances they are trying to escape.70
3. Different Punishments for Different Forms of Abuse
The law has been slow to provide housing recourse for victims
but the law has succeeded in establishing different punishments
for different types of abuse.71 Victims of domestic violence fall into
distinct legal categories under the larger umbrella of domestic
violence based on the type of relationship they have with the
perpetrator and the type of abuse they endure.72 While the specific
characteristics of each category differ slightly in each state,
generally there are uniform definitions for those who suffer
intimate partner violence versus stalking.73
In Georgia, for example, intimate partner violence is
categorized as “family violence,” requiring a close personal
69. See EQUAL RIGHTS CTR., NO VACANCY: HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2008)
(“Domestic . . . violence survivors are also frequently subjected to discrimination
when they apply for housing, simply because they have experienced violence. This
can occur when . . . their past history of victimization may become known to
landlords because they are applying for housing while residing in . . . emergency
shelters.”).
70. See Anne C. Johnson, From House to Home: Creating a Right to Early
Lease Termination for Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 1866
(2006) (“Once victims make the difficult decision to leave their abusers, those who
occupy rental housing face the challenge of avoiding fees related to early lease
termination.”).
71. See
Violence
Prevention,
CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/index.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (noting the different types of abuse and the various
punishments) [https://perma.cc/W2YH-4WCG].
72. See id. (explaining the differences of the categories of domestic violence).
73. See
Georgia
Domestic
Violence
Laws,
FINDLAW,
https://statelaws.findlaw.com/georgia-law/georgia-domestic-violence-laws.html
(last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (noting the differences between intimate partner
violence and stalking according to Georgia law) [https://perma.cc/M75P-BP35];
see also Intimate Partner Violence, NAT’L INSTIT. OF JUST. (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/Pages/welcome.aspx
(last visited Nov. 28, 2018) (explaining what constitutes different types of
domestic violence) [https://perma.cc/3Z3X-SRGK].
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relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.74 These types
of relationships include “present or past spouses, parents of the
same child, parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren,
foster parents and foster children, or other persons living or
formerly living in the same household.”75 Victims of intimate
partner violence are protected under the state’s Family Violence
Act, which affords victims the opportunity for legal remedies if
they suffer abuse, such as obtaining a detailed protective order.76
Protective orders “prohibit[] the offender from having contact with
the victim for a specified period of time.77 If a person is found to
violate a . . . protective order, he or she could be jailed and charged
with a separate crime, including aggravated stalking,” which is a
felony.78 The intimate partner protective orders are extensive,
allowing a court to provide a victim with a variety of legal
remedies.79 While these orders are intended to keep perpetrators
away from victims, they have been ineffective in helping victims
terminate their leases early for the purpose of escaping abuse—
that is, until the Georgia legislature specifically enacted an early
lease termination statute.80
Stalking laws work to protect those who suffer domestic
violence but do not fall under the category of intimate partner
violence.81 The categorization of stalking is relatively new, gaining
legal prominence over the past ten years.82 Those who experience
stalking suffer physical, emotional, and psychological abuse but do
74. See Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73 (“The state of Georgia
defines domestic violence as an act of ‘family violence.’”).
75. Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73.
76. See Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73 (“Georgia’s Family
Violence Act is a law designed to protect individuals who are abused . . . .”).
77. Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73.
78. Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73.
79. See Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73 (“A Family Violence
Protection Order can: . . . [g]ive the victim possession of the house . . . [m]ake the
abuser provide alternate housing . . . [g]ive the victim temporary custody of
shared children . . . [a]ward temporary child support and/or spousal support . . .
[o]rder the abuser to go to counseling . . . .”).
80. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-23 (2018) (detailing how a protective order can
help a victim terminate a lease early).
81. See id. (explaining what constitutes stalking).
82. See
Stalking,
FINDLAW,
https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminalcharges/stalking.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“In most states, stalking laws
pertain to the relatively new crime . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/Y6LR-LJV9].
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not have a legally acknowledged “intimate” relationship with the
abuser.83 For example, the stalking statute in Georgia would
protect individuals who date or dated, but never lived with or had
a child with the perpetrator.84 “By its nature, stalking is not a
one-time event but rather a pattern of behavior meant to cause
harm or distress.”85 One can file for a stalking protective order but,
to have a judge grant the order, the victim must demonstrate that
there have been repeated acts of abuse or harassment.86 A stalking
protective order is less extensive than a Family Violence Protective
Order because the former typically only requires the accused “to
remain a certain distance away from the alleged victim [and not
contact that person] for a specified period of time,” while a Family
Violence Protective Order can award damages, asset protection,
and other financial benefits for the victim.87 Penalties for violating
either type of protective order can be “quite severe, including jail
time in some states.”88
4. The Process: How to Get a Protective Order
Continuing to use Georgia as an example, to obtain a
protective order, one must first file for an emergency ex parte
temporary order that would provide protection for the victim for
up to thirty days.89 A victim fills out both a petition and the actual
ex parte order by writing a brief description of the abuse that has
occurred, first noting the most recent incident that drove the victim
83. See id. (explaining that stalking “involve[s] a clear pattern of conduct in
which the offender follows, harasses, or threatens another person, putting that
person in fear for his or her safety”).
84. See id. (“An individual may be charged with stalking regardless of any
pre-existing relationship with the victim.”).
85. Id.
86. See id. (“It includes repeated harassing or threatening behavior toward
another person, whether that person is a total stranger, slight acquaintance,
current or former intimate partner, or anyone else.”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52 (explaining how a victim
of domestic violence files for a protective order); see also Victim’s Rights,
FULTONCOUNTYGA.GOV, http://www.fultoncountyga.gov/sg-victims-rights (last
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (detailing the process of how one receives a protective order
in Georgia) [https://perma.cc/GK7M-HEJE].
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to seek an order.90 Once the appropriate forms are completed, the
petitioner sees a judge who can grant the emergency ex parte order
the same day.91 The judge can also assign a future court date that
falls within those protected thirty days, at which the respondent
can be present and plead his or her case and present evidence.92 At
that hearing the judge can extend the protective order for up to
three years, making it a permanent protective order, or can
dismiss the matter.93 If the order is dismissed, the petitioner can
always refile if other incidents of abuse occur.94 During the ex parte
hearing the judge could also deny the order without an appeal or
could deny the emergency temporary order but still provide a date
for a fully adjudicated hearing with both parties if the judge
decides not to grant the temporary protective order on ex parte
grounds.95
Once a protective order is granted, the respondent is served
with
the
paperwork
and
cannot
come
near
the
96
petitioner¾typically within 200 yards. The respondent also
cannot contact the petitioner either directly or indirectly, such as
by contacting friends or family.97 If he or she does so, the petitioner
can call the police or file additional paperwork with the court to
90. See Victim’s Rights, supra note 89 (stating that the filer “must be a victim
of family violence or stalking” in order to be qualified to file for a protective order).
91. See Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52 (explaining how a victim
of domestic violence files for a protective order); see also Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89 (“You will then see a judge who will consider giving you an emergency
[temporary protective order].”).
92. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52; see also Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89 (“If the judge grants the ex parte [temporary protective order], you will be
given a date to return to court for a more detailed hearing.”).
93. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52; see also Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89 (“At this second hearing, you must show that the ex parte [temporary
protective order] should be extended.”).
94. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52; see also Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89 (describing the judicial procedure of filing a claim for a temporary
protective order).
95. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52; see also Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89 (detailing the process of how one receives a protective order in Georgia).
96. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52; see also Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89 (stating that a temporary protective order prohibits “the abuser from
doing certain things”).
97. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52; see also Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89 (stating that a temporary protective order requires “the abuser to do
certain things that are needed to keep you and your children safe”).
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document the violation.98 Under either circumstance the
respondent can be arrested, jailed, and prosecuted under various
charges.99
5. Leaving the Home
States and the federal government have enacted laws to
address the housing concerns victims of domestic violence have
when deciding to leave their abusers.100 While the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) works to protect victims from discrimination
on the basis of their status as domestic violence victims, landlords
have historically been able to find loopholes in the statute that
allow them to evict victims because of their status.101 VAWA is
limited in its scope, protecting only victims who are residents of
federally subsidized housing.102 State legislatures have attempted
to bridge this gap in protection by passing laws that protect victims
who reside in privately owned residences.103 Newly enacted state
statutes go so far as to allow victims of domestic violence to
terminate a private lease early so the victim may escape his or her
abuser without financial penalty.104 While older statutes and
98. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52; see also Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89 (detailing the victim’s rights and recourses throughout the entire process).
99. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52; see Victim’s Rights, supra
note 89.
100. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th
Cong. (2013) (serving as the primary federal law protecting female victims of
domestic violence); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017)
(explaining the housing protections for domestic violence victims in Colorado).
101. See S. 47 (identifying several ways victims are protected from
discrimination and landlord mistreatment); see also Johnson v. Palumbo, 60
N.Y.S.3d 472, 474 (App. Div. 2017) (exemplifying how a landlord could utilize a
loophole to get around VAWA, claiming that the victim did not follow proper
procedure of adding a resident to her lease so he evicted her).
102. See S. 47 (noting that the act protects victims who reside in government
subsidized housing).
103. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-23 (2018) (specifying that the statute
protects victims who reside in privately owned housing); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:8-9.6 (West 2008) (addressing how state law protects victims in privately
owned housing).
104. See § 44-7-23 (noting that victims of domestic violence may terminate a
private lease early to escape a domestically violent situation if they follow the
proper procedures).
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VAWA mostly protected against discrimination and eviction, the
newer state statutes recognize the need for some victims to leave
their home to avoid abuse.105
Still, while laws protecting victims of domestic violence
continue to develop, one issue that remains is the discrepancies
among the state statutes.106 Without consistency, domestic
violence victims are frequently left uncertain about the protections
available and what they must do to satisfy their state’s law.107
Inconsistencies also create problems for lawyers and judges who
are unsure about what they can argue and order.108 This Note will
address the discrepancies and offer a potential solution in the form
of a model universal statute.
II. Constitutional Law: The Effect of the Constitution on Tenants’
Rights
Scholars, lawyers, and judges have considered how several
aspects of the Constitution could apply to the protection of
domestic violence victims, including the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, property law concerns, and the Article I
Section 10 Contract Clause.109 These elements of the Constitution

105. See Elly Yu, Bill Would Let Domestic Violence Victims Break Leases
Early, WABE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.wabe.org/bill-let-domestic-violencevictims-break-leases-early/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“We know that a number
of victims of domestic violence do not leave for many reasons, and one of them is
an economic reason that they cannot afford to go somewhere else . . . .”)
[https://perma.cc/VH8A-ZS5L].
106. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (representing a
statute that is very extensive and provides very clear protection for victims); see
also MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-5A-02 (West 2011) (representing a statute
that is too minimal and does not provide enough protective measures or clarity).
107. See State Laws, supra note 25 (providing a description of each state’s law
regarding housing protections for victims of domestic violence in a clear and
concise manner).
108. See Meister v. Kansas City, No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887, at *5
(D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011) (explaining a need for further legal development of the
topic for the court to feel comfortable adjudicating the case accurately and
confidently).
109. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1866 (noting how different aspects of the
Constitution could be interpreted to protect victims of domestic violence, as well
as protect landlords’ property and contract rights).
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could potentially provide protection for both the domestic violence
victims and the landlords.110
A. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment states, “nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”111 Lawyers and scholars have attempted to
argue that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies
to the protection of individuals’ bodies, but several courts have
chosen to neither extend the Due Process Clause protection in
domestic violence cases nor recognize a “fundamental right to be
free from private acts of violence . . . .”112 The Supreme Court has
determined that “the Due Process Clause[] generally confer[s] no
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government itself may not deprive the individual.”113 Yet, the
judicial system has begun to support that the “intimate and
personal choices . . . central to personal dignity and autonomy are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”114
While the Fourteenth Amendment may protect personal
dignity and autonomy, courts have been hesitant to specify that
freedom from domestic violence is included in those protections.115
110. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1873–74 (articulating attempts to protect
victims and landlords by utilizing property rights aspects, such as redistribution).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
112. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1865; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (explaining how the Constitution
cannot be used to protect private individuals from violence); see also Jones v.
Union County, 296 F.3d 417, 426–28 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff did
not have a cognizable equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
for the defendant’s failure to serve an ex parte protection order in a timely
manner).
113. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (1989).
114. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 915 (1992).
115. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 186 (noting that applying substantive due
process to the protection of individuals from domestic violence is improper
because history does not support “such an expansive reading of the constitutional
text”); see, e.g., Jones, 296 F.3d at 426–28 (emphasizing that due process and
Fourteenth Amendment protections do not support special protection of domestic
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Some federal courts have recognized that the government has at
least some duty to protect domestic violence victims by noting that
“[j]ust as the government has a responsibility to protect children
from an abusive parent, so too does the government have a
responsibility to protect a victim of domestic violence from her
partner . . . .”116 Still, the Supreme Court has chosen not to
“expand the concept of substantive due process”117 to these types of
liberty interests “without the guidance of the more specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights.”118 The Court views the Fourteenth
Amendment as protecting citizens from the state and not from one
another.119 It shares an unwillingness to create the fundamental
right of protecting individuals from domestic violence through
common law judicial decisions.120
Had the Supreme Court chosen to recognize protection from
domestic violence as a fundamental right, both the federal
government and states would more likely be able to protect
victims.121 Victims would be better protected if the right were
deemed fundamental because courts would review lease
termination clauses and other property rights concerns more
favorably toward the victim.122 Courts would have to review
domestic violence victims’ claims against landlords under a strict
violence victims).
116. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
117. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
118. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
119. See id. (noting the role of the State Action Doctrine).
120. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989) (presenting a decision that does not support the recognition of protection
from domestic violence as a protected fundamental right); see also Jackson v. City
of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (addressing the Constitution’s
protection of individual private actors, describing it as a “charter of negative
rather than positive liberties . . . protect[ing] Americans from oppression by state
government, not . . . secur[ing] them basic governmental services”).
121. See Symposium, The Constitution and the Obligations of Government to
Secure the Material Preconditions for a Good Society: Rights, Capabilities, and
the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1923 (2001) (“[W]e might reason that
we have a positive right to security against private violence because of a yet more
fundamental right to security against extreme deprivation or impoverishment
that threatens fundamental human capabilities, regardless of whether that
vulnerability can be attributed to . . . undue private aggression.”).
122. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1865 (“A state’s asserted interests in such
penalties would almost certainly involve respect for private contracts and the
promotion of stability in the housing market.”).
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scrutiny standard of review, which is appropriate when evaluating
fundamental rights issues.123 By applying this standard of review,
a state would have to show that its actions were legitimate and
done for a compelling purpose that is narrowly tailored and
necessary.124 But the Court has yet to establish this fundamental
right and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has
proven fairly unsuccessful in protecting domestic violence victims
thus far.125
B. Property Law in the Constitution
Landlords and tenants both have property rights that are
rooted in the judicial and constitutional tradition of commitment
to individual liberty.126 These traditional rights include the concept
of absolutist ownership and “protecting property from
redistribution.”127 Justice John Harlan articulated the absolutist
view of property rights in 1897 by recognizing that “[d]ue
protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital
principle of republican institutions.”128 Scholar James W. Ely
analyzed this statement, concluding that “[h]istorically, property
ownership was viewed as establishing the economic basis for
freedom from governmental coercion and the enjoyment of
123. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)
(explaining that the Court will not interpret and treat all rights the same, as it
will apply strict scrutiny to fundamental rights, such as those found in the Bill of
Rights).
124. See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (noting how
a state’s action must not only be legitimate, but also narrowly tailored and
necessary to survive strict scrutiny).
125. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (1989) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment’s]
purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State
protected them from each other.”).
126. See JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 3d ed.
2008) (“From the time of Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court has
favored the creation of a national market and safeguarded the rights of property
owners.”).
127. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 274 (1990); see also ELY, supra note 126, at 5 (addressing
courts’ historic protection of the “disadvantaged”).
128. Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235–36
(1897).
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liberty.”129 Freedom from government coercion and freedom to
enjoy liberty speak to both the landlords’ concerns today and the
tenants’ concerns.
Landlords tend to support the absolutist view of property
rights and the desire to be free from government intervention.130
Many landlords feel that, because they own their property and
have established contracts with tenants, the government should
respect those private interactions and not intrude for the purpose
of allowing tenants to terminate their leases early.131 In their view,
it is not their problem if a tenant has a personal issue and that
issue should not mean that landlord rights are infringed upon.132
As owners, landlords cherish the right to exploit their property for
profit.133 They assert that personal and private relationships of
their tenants should not permit governmental interference in the
contract between landlords and tenants.134
When testifying against a Washington state bill that would
allow domestic violence victims to terminate their leases early
after fulfilling certain requirements, one landlord expressed his
concern for property owners’ rights by claiming that “[t]here are
already too many protections in the law for victims.135 This bill
opens the door and could impact other types of contracts such as
for cars or mortgages.”136 Traditionally, this landlord’s concern
would be accepted by the government because the historic
129. ELY, supra note 126, at 3.
130. See Cary Spivak & Mary Spicuzza, Some Wisconsin Lawmakers Double
as Landlords—and Have Passed Laws that Undermine Renters’ Rights,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL
(June
14,
2019,
5:00
AM),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/investigations/2019/06/14/wisconsinlawmaker-landlords-change-rental-laws-not-favor-tenants-rentersrights/1210327001/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (sharing a Republican lawmaker
and landlord’s view that “as a conservative, [he] fundamentally believe[s] in the
idea of private property rights”) [https://perma.cc/5Z8C-6AE7].
131. See H.R. Rep. No. 2EHB-1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004) (documenting landlord
testimony claiming there are too many laws that protect victims already).
132. See id. (sharing a landlord’s testimony against a bill that would allow
domestic violence victims to terminate their lease early for the purpose of
escaping an abusive home).
133. See id. (providing a landlord’s testimony emphasizing the landlord’s
interest in private property rights).
134. See id. (emphasizing the landlords’ interest in private property rights).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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“protection given to property was fully consistent with one major
theme of American constitutionalism—the restraint of government
power over individuals.”137
As time has progressed and cultural perceptions of rights have
evolved, this absolutist view has begun to fade.138 “[A] study of the
constitutional status of property and economic interests reveals
much about the attitudes and aspirations of successive
generations.”139 Landlords often still attempt to argue the
absolutist view during legislative hearings and court proceedings,
but modern courts’ and legislatures’ established rejection of that
viewpoint leaves their efforts likely unsuccessful.140
1. Human Dignity and Property Rights
Because traditional interpretations of the Constitution protect
human dignity and the freedom to enjoy liberty, courts have
construed the Constitution in a way that is contrary to the
absolutist view of property rights.141 Early in American history
courts began to establish exceptions to the absolutist view of
property rights by recognizing assertions of nuisance claims and
rights to hunt on unenclosed land.142 Judicial rulings in favor of
eminent domain power further limited the absolutist view.143 Ely
asserts that “a drastic source of interference with property rights
is eminent domain—the power to compel a transfer of property

137. ELY, supra note 126, at 3.
138. See ELY, supra note 126, at 3 (addressing the changing perception of
property rights).
139. ELY, supra note 126, at 3.
140. See 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 4 (proposing a bill to provide domestic
violence victims with certain tenant rights, in spite of the opposition of landlords).
141. See ELY, supra note 126, at 5 (“[A]t no time has the [Supreme] Court
blocked all regulatory or redistributive legislation or sought to impose a strict
laissez-faire regime.”).
142. See Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] LRE & I. App. 3 (HL) 330 (noting in the
dissent that an individual should not have absolute ability to use their land as
they chose if it harms another’s enjoyment of his land); see also Pierson v. Post,
3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (articulating whose property a fox is when it is
captured on open land).
143. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1876) (providing an early
understanding that the Fifth Amendment provides eminent domain power).
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from a private owner to the government for public use.”144 More
recently, courts’ holdings have reflected a recognition of human
dignity rights as preeminent over absolute property rights.145
These judicial rulings have established a new tradition of
balancing the absolute right to property with the protection of
humanity and enjoyment of liberty, ultimately favoring human
dignity and freedom of enjoyment over absolutism.146 However,
while a variety of classes of individuals are protected under
precedent, domestic violence victims still suffer in court when
trying to argue for the protection of their human dignity.147
The rejection of absolutism has not spread to cases concerning
domestic violence.148 Landlords have been successful in their
claims to either evict a victim or not allow her to terminate her
lease early for the purpose of living in a habitable, safe
environment, interestingly contradicting the intent of the implied
warranty of habitability.149 The implied warranty of habitability—
a property law concept—guarantees a safe and sanitary home,
providing a tenant with quiet enjoyment of the dwelling.150
Landlords’ failure to cooperate with tenants’ reasonable requests
144. ELY, supra note 126, at 5.
145. See Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991) (explaining the
concept of implied warranty of habitability and how a tenant can be financially
protected when living conditions are inhumane).
146. See ELY, supra note 126, at 5 (“[J]udicial review of economic and social
legislation, such as health and safety regulations, has not always resulted in
rulings favorable to business interests.”).
147. See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677–78 (D. Vt. 2005)
(exemplifying a case where the victim suffered domestic violence, the landlord
violated the Violence Against Women’s Act, but the victim still lost her case); see
also Mangan Realty, LLC v. Anthony, 64 Misc. 3d 686, 689 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2019)
(determining that the landlord may have had other legitimate reasons to evict the
victim-tenant aside from her status as a domestic violence victim, rejecting her
claim).
148. See Bouley, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 677–78 (emphasizing that victim who
suffered from domestic violence lost her case despite there being little evidence
that the landlord had preexisting problems with victim as a tenant; see also
Mangan Realty, LLC, 64 Misc. 3d at 689 (identifying a case where a victim of
domestic violence had her claim dismissed because the landlord presented other
reasons for why tenant was evicted).
149. See Mangan Realty, LLC, 64 Misc. 3d at 680 (verifying how courts will
weigh the law in favor of the landlord and not the victim).
150. See Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Mass. 2009) (explaining
what the implied warranty of habitability entails).
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to ensure a safe dwelling contradicts the intent of the implied
warranty of habitability.151 Enacting legislation has become the
most plausible method to overcome the rejection domestic violence
victims face when attempting to use the judicial system to uphold
their liberty interests.152
2. The Contract Clause and Property Rights
Some landlords reference the Contract Clause, Article I,
Section 10 of the United States Constitution, when trying to
restrict domestic violence victims from terminating their leases
early.153 The Contract Clause states, “No state shall . . . pass any
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”154 Historically, “the [C]ontract
[C]lause was the most widely used protection of individual
property rights against state regulation.”155 However, courts’
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause diminished
the power of the Contract Clause.156 The Contract Clause no longer
was a shield against government interference with contracts in
cases addressing property rights.157 Courts have continuously
151. See id. (explaining that a visitor’s right to collect damages for an injury
caused by a breach of implied warranty of habitability is derived from a tenant’s
expectation to invite guests and a landlord’s contractual obligation to deliver and
maintain a habitable premise).
152. See 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 1 (“By this act, the legislature intends to
increase safety for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking by
removing barriers to safety and offering protection against discrimination.”).
153. See id. at 4 (noting via landlord testimony how the bill would harm
contract credibility).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
155. Janet I. Levine, The Contract Clause: A Constitutional Basis for
Invalidating State Legislation, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927, 930 (1979).
156. See They Can’t Do That, Can They? Constitutional Limitations on the
Seizure
of
Underwater
Mortgage,
JONES
DAY
(June
2012),
https://www.jonesday.com/They_Cant_Do_That/# (last visited Nov. 28, 2019)
(“Contracts constitute property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and
are susceptible to a ‘taking’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause. To
determine whether a contract right has been taken, courts apply either a
categorical test or . . . fact-dependent analysis employed in regulatory takings
cases.”) [https://perma.cc/HVL4-FBKQ]; see also, e.g., Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of
Comm’rs of Jay Cty., 57 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1995) (detailing how the Eminent
Domain power supersedes contracts).
157. See Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case
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exercised their ability to neglect the Contract Clause when
considering property law issues, such as cases involving adverse
possession claims.158 Successful adverse possession cases allow an
individual to gain title to a piece of property simply by fulfilling
certain elements that demonstrate how that individual utilized the
property more than the actual owner, disregarding the
contract-holder’s legal ownership.159 Adverse possession reflects
the judicial system’s waning appreciation for contract sanctity
regarding property.160
Landlords have taken issue with courts and legislatures that
discount the Contract Clause, particularly regarding federal and
state laws that protect domestic violence victims from unfriendly
lease provisions.161 Many landlords have been vocal about their
distaste for these laws, fearing “that early-termination statutes
create a special class of people exempt from general leasing rules
and eventually will lead to domestic violence victims having the
freedom to violate other contractual obligations.”162 During a
Washington State House Judiciary Committee hearing regarding
the passage of a bill to protect domestic violence victims when
renting a residence, several members of housing associations and

Study in the Relationship between Individual Liberties and Constitutional
Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 272 (1988) (articulating the effects of the Taking
Clause).
158. See generally Gurwit v. Kannatzer, 788 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(demonstrating that one couple was granted title to land owned by another by
fulfilling the requirements of adverse possession); see also Howard v. Kunto, 477
P.2d 210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (showing how fulfilling the adverse possession
requirements allows an individual to gain title of real property regardless of who
actually owned it).
159. See More v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71, 77–78 (Ky. 2010) (defining adverse
possession).
160. See Gurwit, 788 S.W.2d at 295 (exemplifying a case where the court
granted a couple their quiet title action through adverse possession despite the
title for the land being owned by another couple).
161. See 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 4 (sharing testimony contesting the limited
liberty of landlords regarding contracts with domestic violence victims); see also
New Domestic Violence Law Impacts Your Rights, 7 LANDLORD NEWS 1, 1–3 (Aug.
2005),
https://www.thslawfirm.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/52_HTSPCLandlordNewsAugust2005.pdf (last visited
Nov. 28, 2019) [hereinafter LANDLORD NEWS] (articulating concerns landlords
have with the laws) [https://perma.cc/TR5V-A7L6].
162. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1868.
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landlord interest groups testified against the bill.163 They claimed
that “[t]he bill creates a new special class of people who don’t have
to follow the rules . . . . Now anyone can say I am a victim and then
get out of a lease.”164
Additionally, Landlord News, a newsletter published by a law
firm in Colorado, addressed landlord concerns about legislation
allowing domestic violence victims to terminate their leases
early.165 Following the passage of one of these bills, the newsletter
published a story expressing “concern[ ] that the new law will be
abused by some residents to escape their rental responsibilities.”166
Ultimately, the landlord concerns fail to appreciate the measures
included in these bills that require proof of domestic violence, such
as a court order, and why the tenant needs to terminate his or her
lease early.167
While courts are willing to overlook the Contract Clause when
considering certain property law issues, many do not place victims’
rights in that category.168 Therefore, both federal and state
legislatures have stepped in to promulgate laws that provide more
protections for domestic violence victims, furthering the modern
practice of discounting the Contract Clause in favor of human
dignity concerns.169
Ultimately, legal protections of the United States Constitution
have yet to provide proper recourse for domestic violence victims

163. See 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 4 (sharing landlord testimony against the
bill).
164. Id.
165. See LANDLORD NEWS, supra note 161 (“Only time will tell if our concern
becomes reality.”).
166. LANDLORD NEWS, supra note 161.
167. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (detailing each of the
requirements that must be satisfied to be able to terminate a lease early).
168. See Jennings v. Hous. Auth., No. WDQ-13-2164, 2014 WL 346641 (D. Md.
Jan. 29, 2014) (demonstrating a lack of judicial understanding of the patterns of
domestic violence, allowing the judge to exercise complete discretion against the
victim); see also Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 6–
10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (exemplifying judicial interpretation that did not
allow the judge to rule in favor of the victim).
169. See Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat.
1902 (1994) (representing the federal effort to protect domestic violence victims
in rentals); see also § 38-12-402 (exemplifying one of several state statutes
protecting domestic violence victims in rentals).
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regarding housing concerns.170 The federal government took the
first step to resolve the issue legally when it ratified VAWA.171
III. Federal Law: The Violence Against Women Act
A. History of VAWA
Legislatures, both federal and state, have in recent years been
more aggressive than courts about moving the balance between
private property rights and victims’ rights in favor of victims.172
VAWA was first enacted in 1994 as an effort to combat violent
crime against women.173 Creation of the act was prompted by a
long history of violence against women, particularly intimate
partner violence.174 “The public and the criminal justice
system . . . [began] to view family violence as a crime rather than
a private family matter.”175 President Bill Clinton signed into law
the first iteration of VAWA.176 When remarking on VAWA,
then-Senator Joe Biden clarified that “[t]he shortfalls of legal
responses and the need for a change in attitudes toward violence
against women were primary reasons cited for the passage of
VAWA.”177 The Act has been revised several times, including in
170. See tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (demonstrating the need for remedies for
domestic violence victims in terms of housing).
171. See id. (serving as the first iteration of VAWA).
172. See id. (identifying congressional attempts to pass legislation that will
provide remedies for domestic violence victims); see also 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws
1 (identifying Washington State’s attempt to pass legislation to protect victim of
domestic violence in regard to housing).
173. See THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA): HISTORICAL OVERVIEW,
FUNDING, AND REAUTHORIZATION 1 (Cong. Research Serv., 2d ed. 2018)
[hereinafter HISTORICAL OVERVIEW] (“The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
was originally enacted in 1994 (P.L. 103-322). It addressed congressional concerns
about violent crime, and violence against women in particular, in several ways.”).
174. See id. (noting that in the 1960s the violent crime rate steadily role, in
the 1970s organizations began to demand attention be paid to violence against
women, and in the 1980s research studies began to focus on violence against
women).
175. Id.
176. See id. at 2 (“In 1994, Congress passed and President Clinton signed into
law, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322),
which included VAWA as Title IV.”).
177. Id.
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2000, 2005, and, most recently, in 2013 under President Barack
Obama.178 The first version of the Act was primarily an effort to
utilize the criminal justice system to address community responses
to violence against women.179 The 2000 revision also addressed
crimes of dating violence and stalking.180 The first effort to address
domestic violence victims’ housing concerns was added to VAWA
in 2005.181 President Obama’s 2013 reauthorization added
additional housing rights for domestic violence victims, and
additional protections for Native Americans and members of the
LGBTQ community.182
The 2013 iteration is the current version of VAWA.183 The
included housing provisions are the federal measures that are in
effect today to protect domestic violence victims.184 “VAWA 2013
added housing rights for victims of domestic violence, dating
violence, sexual assault, and stalking, including a provision stating
that applicants may not be denied public housing assistance based
on their status as victims of domestic violence, dating violence,
sexual assault, or stalking.”185 The Act also includes provisions
allowing landlords to transfer victims to other publicly funded
housing if similar units are available so the abuser will not know
the victim’s new address and includes protections against eviction
based on a person’s status as a victim.186 “Additionally, [VAWA]
178.
179.

See id. (noting how the Act has been revised).
See What Is the Violence Against Women Act?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/resources/vawa/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019)
(“VAWA 1994 fostered: Community-coordinated responses that brought together,
for the first time, the criminal justice system, the social services system, and
private nonprofit organizations responding to domestic violence and sexual
assault.”) [https://perma.cc/CUB8-KNK9].
180. See id. (noting what was added to the Act in 2000).
181. See id. (“VAWA 2005 created notable new focus areas such
as . . . protecting individuals from unfair eviction due to their status as victims of
domestic violence or stalking.”).
182. See id. (clarifying what was added to the 2013 version of VAWA).
183. See HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21 (identifying what the
current law is).
184. See HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21 (articulating how the
2013 version of the act addressed housing concerns).
185. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21.
186. See HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21 (“[VAWA] required each
executive department carrying out a covered housing program to adopt a plan
whereby tenants who are victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual
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require[s] the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) to establish policies and procedures under which a victim
requesting such a transfer may receive Section 8 assistance under
the U.S. Housing Act of 1937.”187 Prior to VAWA, “Section 8
tenants could only move and continue to receive housing assistance
if they notified the [public housing agency] ahead of time,
terminated their existing lease within the lease provisions, and
located acceptable housing. Now, Section 8 tenants can circumvent
these requirements . . . .”188 VAWA allows victims to sidestep
burdensome requirements if they “(1) complied with all other
Section 8 obligations, (2) moved in order to protect someone who is
or has been a domestic violence victim, and (3) ‘reasonably
believed’ that they were ‘imminently threatened by harm from
further violence’ by staying in the subsidized unit.”189
While these provisions were a crucial step to protect domestic
violence victims, VAWA only protects those who reside in federally
subsidized housing and not those who rent from private
landlords.190 The Act serves to prevent landlords from evicting
victims of domestic violence, but it fails to allow victims to
terminate their leases early for the purposes of avoiding abuse.191
VAWA also unintentionally includes various loopholes that
landlords have used.192 Several court cases addressing housing
provisions of VAWA identify ways landlords have been able to
legally avoid abiding by the Act.193 Case law demonstrates how
assault, or stalking can be transferred to another available and safe unit of
assisted housing.”).
187. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21–22 (defining Section 8
assistance as the government’s payment of rental housing to private landlords on
behalf of low-income individuals).
188. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1870.
189. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1870 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(5) (2012)).
190. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th
Cong. (2013) (articulating the elements of the current VAWA).
191. See id. (outlining current protections for domestic violence victims under
VAWA).
192. See Johnson v. Palumbo, 60 N.Y.S.3d 472, 474 (App. Div. 2017) (sharing
how one landlord used a paperwork loophole to evict a victim).
193. See id. (emphasizing how landlords have used loopholes in VAWA to
circumvent the Act); see also Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18,
slip op. at 6–10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (noting how a landlord was able to
evict a victim and skirt VAWA by claiming the victim participated in the violence).
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landlords sometimes successfully exploit loopholes in statutory
provisions that are unfavorable to tenants but other times fail to
garner a verdict in their favor despite efforts to use loopholes.194
B. The Case of Pamela LeMasters
In a 2016 case, a landlord availed himself of a VAWA loophole
to evict a victim by claiming that the victim did not follow proper
procedure of adding a resident to her lease.195 The landlord,
Gorsuch Homes, Inc., claimed the tenant, Pamela LeMasters, had
violated a provision of her lease by allowing a “non-trespassed
individual onto the property continually” and permitting “criminal
activity” by that visitor.196 During a hearing, the landlord testified
that LeMasters’s husband had trespassed onto the property even
after he was served with a no-trespass order resulting from
instances of domestic violence.197 Several staff members of Gorsuch
Homes, Inc. testified to witnessing events of domestic violence.198
The landlord testified that when he served the husband with the
order, LeMasters appeared thankful.199 Ultimately, the husband
trespassed again.200 “According to [the landlord], LeMasters did
not deny that [the husband] has been on the property, but tried to
explain that she could not get him to leave because she was
financially reliant on [him].”201 LeMasters testified that, though
her husband was abusive toward her, she did not call the police
194. See Gorsuch Homes, Inc., slip op. at 6–10 (exemplifying a landlord
successfully exploiting a loophole in court); see also Johnson, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 472
(exemplifying a landlord attempting to utilize a loophole).
195. See Gorsuch Homes, Inc., slip op. at 6–10 (detailing the elements of the
case).
196. Id. at 2.
197. See id. (“Bailey testified that the specific activities that gave rise to the
eviction notice were separate occasions when James LeMasters . . . LeMasters’s
husband, trespassed on Gorsuch Homes’s property after being served with a no
trespass order.”).
198. See id. at 3–4 (explaining how several staff members of the landlord had
witnessed incidences of abuse, including one incident when a staff member offered
to call the police for LeMasters).
199. See id. at 2 (“Bailey added that LeMasters appeared grateful and
promised that James would no longer step foot on the property.”).
200. See id. (noting the husband returned to the property uninvited).
201. Id. at 6.

WHERE IS HOME?

309

because she was “scared.”202 “Further, she explained that her only
source of income was the child support paid by [her husband] and
that she was afraid that if he were to go to prison, then the child
support payments would stop.”203
Even though LeMasters’s situation is a common experience of
victims and the law has provided recourse for such in the past, this
court still ruled in the landlord’s favor.204 LeMasters asserted that
the landlord had evicted her due to her husband’s “criminal
activity” of domestic violence, “which was outside the limited
allegation of ‘trespass’ contained in the written notice of
termination.”205 The court disagreed and claimed that LeMasters
“was evicted due to her willing participation in [her husband’s]
multiple and unlawful violations of the landlord’s no trespass
order.”206 Those who understand the patterns of domestic violence
recognize that a victim remaining in a violent situation out of fear
cannot be construed as willingly participating in the partner’s
actions because the victim is under insuperable pressure to
tolerate and abet it.207
Further, the judge asserted that staff members’ testimony
regarding witnessing incidents of domestic violence was
“merely . . . an explanation of the circumstances which led to the
reason for the no trespass order and not as an independent ground
for the termination . . . .”208 This interpretation ignores the
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 10.
Id.
See Wendy L. Patrick, Why Domestic Violence Victims Don’t “Just Leave”,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/whybad-looks-good/201804/why-domestic-violence-victims-dont-just-leave
(last
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“Some of the reasons they discovered included financial
need, lack of another place to go, as well as reported lack of help from law
enforcement.”) [https://perma.cc/W3J6-XHBC]; see also Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v.
LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 6–10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (noting
that the judge held in favor of Gorsuch Homes, Inc.).
205. Gorsuch Homes, Inc., slip op. at 16.
206. Id. at 16.
207. See Why Do Abuse Victims Stay?, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ROUNDTABLE,
https://www.domesticviolenceroundtable.org/abuse-victims-stay.html
(last
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (sharing how victims of domestic violence often feel
trapped . . . because they cannot reasonably leave their abuser for lack of
financial support, a place to go, or fear that the abuser will find and kill them)
[https://perma.cc/ZP8C-KG8K].
208. Gorsuch Homes, Inc., slip op. at 7.
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landlord’s assertion that part of LeMasters’s violation was her
husband’s “criminal activity.”209 Here, the judge misinterprets the
facts to determine that the husband’s “criminal activity” was not a
violation that led to eviction, thereby discounting the landlord’s
explanation for eviction, which violated VAWA, and asserting his
own reasoning so as to sidestep finding a VAWA violation.210
This case demonstrates how landlords have been able to take
advantage of statute wording gaps and how judges’ lack of
understanding about the common behavior of victims allows
misinterpretation of victims’ actions.211 If VAWA protections had
been applied to the case, the landlord would not have been able to
evict LeMasters if the eviction was due to her status as a victim of
domestic violence.212 However, the landlord asserted that
LeMasters’s actions in allegedly permitting her husband to violate
the trespass provision of the lease was the reason she was evicted,
not because she was a victim of domestic violence.213 The landlord
presented the facts of the case to indicate that LeMasters allowed
her husband to enter the home, which disregards the husband’s
power over LeMasters.214 By presenting the case in this way, the
judge did not have to apply VAWA, even though the case truly
revealed a VAWA violation.215
209. See id. at 2 (“Bailey testified that LeMasters was being evicted for
material noncompliance with the lease. Next, counsel asked, ‘Specifically in what
manner?’, and Bailey replied, ‘Specifically criminal activity by a visitor.’”).
210. See id. at 5 (“[I]t is clear from the record that all of the witnesses who
testified as to alleged criminal activity . . . introduced that testimony merely as
an explanation of the circumstances which led to the reason for the no trespass
order and not as an independent ground for the termination as alleged by
LeMasters.”).
211. See id. (demonstrating how reliance on the fact that a lease provision was
violated, not acknowledging that it was violated because of domestic violence, is
a method for landlords to skirt VAWA protections and how judges allow this
process to continue).
212. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th
Cong. (2013) (reflecting a provision of VAWA).
213. See Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 7 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (sharing the landlord’s decision to ignore the occurrence
of domestic violence, claiming an alternate reason so he could evict the victim).
214. See id. (demonstrating how the landlord alleged that LeMasters was a
willing participant, which the judge accepted on its face without considering the
underlying issue of abuse).
215. See id. (revealing how LeMasters was evicted because she was a
domestic-violence victim).
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The dissent was better reasoned, stating, “Landlords, such as
Gorsuch Homes, cannot be allowed to continue to evict tenants,
such as LeMasters, using vague and overly broad statements
contained as the grounds for eviction.”216 The dissent recognized
the truth that LeMasters was evicted in part because she was in a
relationship with someone who abused her at the home, which
directly violates VAWA.217 The dissenting opinion rightfully
requested that courts no longer allow landlords to skirt VAWA
requirements by improperly claiming a victim violated provisions
of her lease for a reason that was not driven by her status as a
victim of domestic violence.218
C. The Case of Amanda Chambers Johnson
In contrast to the ruling in Gorsuch Homes, a judge applied
VAWA protections in a 2017 case to a victim during her eviction
proceeding.219 Amanda Chambers Johnson and her five children
were living in a federally subsidized apartment when she received
a notice that her lease would be terminated because she violated
Section 8 housing program rules.220 “The determination to
terminate her benefits was confirmed based upon the finding that
she was obligated, but failed, to request permission to add
Antwone Jordan-McGill (McGill) as an occupant to her subsidized
216. See id. at 10 (referencing statements about “criminal activity” being the
reason why LeMasters was evicted).
217. See id. (sharing a view on why LeMasters was evicted).
218. See id. (reflecting that landlords and courts need to acknowledge the
presence of domestic violence in an eviction proceeding, instead of relying on
generalized claims like trespass that do not reflect the relationship between the
trespasser and the victim, and that courts should not allow eviction in spite of
domestically violent acts).
219. See Johnson v. Palumbo, 154 A.D.3d 231, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)
(“[W]e conclude that [Johnson] was entitled to the housing protections of VAWA,
which prohibited her termination from the [Section 8] program on this ground.”).
220. See id. at 233
The petitioner, Amanda Chambers Johnson, lived in an apartment in
Poughkeepsie with her five children with the assistance of rent subsidy
benefits under the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. On
February 11, 2014, she was notified that her benefits under the
program were being terminated due to alleged violations of the
program rules.
(citations omitted).
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apartment.”221 The landlord failed to acknowledge that Johnson
did not add McGill’s name because she did not consider him a
co-tenant. She did not want him there, but McGill forced himself
into Johnson’s home on multiple occasions.222 Johnson “was
subjected to an escalating pattern of stalking and abusive behavior
and domestic violence by McGill, a former intimate partner, whose
course of abusive and violent conduct against her included his
unwanted presence in her apartment.”223 Johnson testified that
McGill “became terrifying.” He started asking the petitioner for keys
to her apartment. She told him ‘no,’ but, against her wishes, McGill
took a spare set of keys . . . . He began entering the petitioner’s home
at will, “whenever he felt like it,” and told her that he would never
give her back her keys.”224

When asked why she did not seek out an order of protection,
Johnson explained to the court what LeMasters’s judge was unable
to understand:
I know it’s hard to understand. You never think that someone
will control you . . . . But when you are in that situation, it’s a
totally different world . . . . When you are scared of somebody
and you have five kids to take care of, to get ready for school, to
go to work, to put on a smile every single day, it changes the
dynamic of things that become important.225

Johnson testified that “McGill was ‘just a very wicked individual
and [I] truly could not have done anything different than what [I]
did to survive.’”226
During a hearing to reinstate her lease, the apartment
complex housing committee ruled in favor of the landlord on the
grounds that Johnson violated a provision of her lease by not
adding McGill’s name, which was required because he was there

221. Id. at 233–34.
222. See id. at 239–40 (“[T]he hearing officer nonetheless concluded that there
was no evidence of violence or fear in June of 2012, and even were there evidence
of violence that early, he ‘fail[ed] to see how that fear would excuse the [petitioner
from] requesting to add another family member.’”).
223. Id. at 234.
224. Id. at 236.
225. Id. at 237–38.
226. Id. at 237.
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so often, notwithstanding her defense of the violation.227 The
landlord testified, “[I] fail to see how that fear would excuse the
[petitioner from] requesting to add another family member [to her
lease].”228 The housing committee sided with the landlord and held
in his favor. Johnson appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court of
New York Appellate Division.229
The Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division ruled in
favor of Johnson.230 The court determined that “[t]here was no
evidence presented at the hearing from which the hearing officer
could conclude that the petitioner voluntarily gave McGill
permission to reside at the contract unit . . . or that his ultimate
residency there for some period of time was unrelated to the
domestic violence he perpetrated upon her.”231 The court also
shared that it would be completely unreasonable for the landlord
to require Johnson to add McGill as a resident of her home because
he showed up uninvited so often.232 “[R]equiring the petitioner to
do so would effectively require her to legitimize his access to the
contract unit by making him an established part of her household,
thus giving him greater power and control over her.”233
VAWA is intended to protect victims from situations like
Johnson’s, where victims have to choose between remaining in an
abusive household or keeping stable housing for themselves and

227. See id. at 239 (noting how even if Johnson was a victim of domestic
violence, she still could have added her husband, the abuser, to her lease, and by
not doing so, she was properly evicted for failing to comply with that lease
provision).
228. Id. at 239–40.
229. See id. at 240 (“The petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article
78 proceeding in the Supreme Court seeking review of the determination,
arguing, among other things, that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law in
concluding that VAWA did not prevent her tenancy from being terminated.”).
230. See id. at 246 (“In sum, we find that the hearing officer’s determination
was affected by an error of law and rendered in violation of VAWA.”).
231. Id. at 243.
232. See id.
[E]vidence that McGill’s presence in and access to the contract unit
was the result of conduct that constitutes domestic violence and
stalking as defined by the VAWA, it would be unreasonable and
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to require the petitioner to
seek permission to add McGill as an occupant of the unit.
233. Id.
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their children.234 The judge concluded that “[t]his is a choice that a
domestic violence victim should not have to make and we decline
to read VAWA in such a way, which is plainly inconsistent with its
salutary purposes.”235 In Johnson’s case, VAWA worked exactly as
it was intended.236 Thankfully for Johnson, the judge adjudicating
her case understood the underpinnings of VAWA and ruled in her
favor.237 Johnson’s case confirms how LeMasters’s case
demonstrates that unfortunately VAWA is not always applied to
abuse cases when it could and should be.238
D. Harms of Inadequate Legal Representation
Domestic violence victims who receive poor legal
representation face additional challenges when entitled to VAWA
protection.239 A 2014 case reveals how a lawyer’s improper decision
to not assert a VAWA violation claim, coupled with a judge’s
apparent bias, allowed a victim of domestic violence to be denied
housing protection.240 Jennings, the victim, lived in Section 8
housing with several of her children.241 One of her children,
Barrett, had “been imprisoned since 2011, and [was] accordingly
234. See id. (“The hearing officer[] fail[ed] to recognize that McGill’s presence
in and access to the contract unit was the result of domestic violence [and] did not
take into account the dynamics of domestic violence . . . .”).
235. Id. at 243–44.
236. See id. (serving to properly protect a domestic violence victim from
intimate partner abuse and abuse from her landlord because of her status as a
victim).
237. See id. at 243 (“To [conclude] that [Johnson] violated . . . Section
8 . . . by failing to . . . add McGill as an occupant would place her in the untenable
position of . . . choos[ing] between . . . an abusive situation . . . or facing the loss
of the housing assistance . . . . [A] choice that a domestic violence victim should
not have to make . . . .”).
238. See Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 6–10
(Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (representing one case of many where VAWA was
unable to protect domestic violence victims from a landlord’s abuse of power).
239. See, e.g., Jennings v. Hous. Auth., No. WDQ-13-2164, 2014 WL 346641
(D. Md. Jan. 29, 2014) (including both of these issues in this case).
240. See id. (demonstrating how Jennings’s lawyer did not even introduce a
VAWA claim when the Act would have protected her housing rights, while also
revealing how judges can interpret a case in a way that is severely biased against
the victim of domestic violence).
241. See id. at 1 (noting Jennings’s children’s living situation).
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‘ineligible to participate in the HCV Program.’”242 Barrett never
visited or stayed at Jennings’s home.243 “In April 2012, Housing
Authority employees allegedly contacted Jennings’s landlord,
Dominion Properties, LLC (Dominion), and ‘compelled’ Dominion
to ‘fraudulently modif[y] the lease agreement for’ the . . . home, by
adding Barrett ‘to the list of tenants residing at’ the . . . home
without Jennings’s ‘written permission.’”244 Jennings then received
a notice informing her that her Section 8 housing would be
terminated.245 “The notice advised Jennings that the reasons for
termination included ‘a 2010 incident of domestic violence of which
Ms. Jennings was the victim[,] and two 2010 incidents of criminal
activity by Barrett.’”246
The primary issue here regarding the challenges of applying
VAWA to protect domestic violence victims is that Jennings’s
lawyer failed to assert a claim that the landlord violated VAWA.247
The landlord blatantly stated that one of his reasons for evicting
Jennings was because she was a victim of domestic violence, which
is exactly what VAWA is intended to protect against.248 Jennings
would have had a far better chance of her case succeeding had the
lawyer asserted a VAWA violation claim.249

242. Id.; see also Housing and Community Development, FAIRFAX COUNTY VA.,
https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/housing/rentalhousing/housingchoicevoucher (last
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (defining the “Housing Choice Voucher (HVC) Program as
a federally funded program designed to assist low-income families with their
housing needs. Participants in the HCV program receive assistance to rent
private market apartments.”) [https://perma.cc/2FMD-8PCF].
243. See Jennings, 2014 WL 346641, at *3 (explaining whether Barrett
resided at the residence).
244. Id.
245. See id. (“In early May 2012, the Housing Authority notified Jennings that
her participation in the HCV program would be terminated effective June 5,
2012.”).
246. Id.
247. See id. (representing a failure to assert a claim, here, regarding VAWA,
that the lawyers’ client could succeed on).
248. See id. at *1 (“The notice advised Jennings that the reasons for the
termination included ‘a 2010 incident of domestic violence of which Ms. Jennings
was the victim . . . .’”).
249. See generally id. (noting why Jennings lost her case, but including facts
that would apply to the protections of VAWA).
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The second issue is the judge’s decision not to give credence to
any of Jennings’s six claims.250 The judge interpreted the law in a
way that disregarded the blatant wrongs committed against
Jennings.251 The judge could have recognized a VAWA violation or
given credibility to Jennings’s claims, accepting her arguments in
recognition of her lawyer’s poor representation so as to allow her
claim to succeed under VAWA, but instead harshly adjudicated
Jennings’s claims.252 The judge acknowledged he understood that
the Housing Commissioner “told Jennings ‘in front of [the
landlord], members of the general public[,] and [his] secretary,’
that she was a ‘disgrace to society, a disruption to the community,
the worst things that ever lived in section 8, and you should teach
your kids how to stop ruining your life; and, if I could help you,
which I can, I wouldn’t help you.’”253 The judge also acknowledged
that the Commissioner blatantly lied to Jennings about her ability
to appeal her eviction by telling her there was nothing she could
do.254
When addressing Jennings’s claims, the judge analyzed her
strongest arguments last in his final opinion, focusing on the
procedural flaws in Jennings’s claim as reason why Jennings
should lose, and disregarded applicable law or public policy that
would protect Jennings.255 The combination of less-than-astute
representation and a judge ill-inclined to sympathize with the
victim left little room for success in a claim regarding eviction due
to one’s status as a victim.256
250. See generally id. (concluding that the judge rejected all of Jennings’s
claims).
251. See id. (explaining how the judge was dismissing all of Jennings’s claims
based on perceived procedural errors, while disregarding direct violations of
VAWA).
252. See id. at *11 (revealing how the judge decided to dismiss all claims based
on failures to allege enough facts, refusing to interpret the facts that were
alleged).
253. Id. at *1.
254. See id. (“He also ‘intentionally lied’ to Jennings ‘about her procedural
rights’ to appeal the result of the informal hearing by ‘Judicial Review or
Administrative Mandamus in the Circuit Court’ by telling her ‘there is nothing
more to do.’”).
255. See id. at *3–9 (sharing the pleading mistakes Jennings made, refusing
to recognize the domestic abuse she had experienced and failing to give adequate
weight to the mistreatment she experienced regarding housing).
256. See generally id. (emphasizing elements of the case that disfavored
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E. The Need for Legal Protection in Addition to VAWA
The bulk of cases that demonstrate issues with VAWA’s ability
to protect domestic violence victims indicate that the Act is
insufficient because it does not apply to private leases and
loopholes are easily found.257 Several states’ recent promulgation
of statutes filling the gaps in coverage is a positive step to increase
protections.258 Aside from extending lease termination ability to
private lease holders, the state statutes also tend to address early
termination of leases and eviction concerns.259 Still, inconsistencies
among state statutes and the limited number of states that have
promulgated statutes pose continued challenges for domestic
violence victims.260
IV. State Statutes
A. State Police Powers
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants states
police powers.261 These powers provide states with broad rights
that allow their legislatures to interfere with private leases for the
purpose of protecting domestic violence victims.262 “The police
Jennings having success in her claim).
257. See, e.g., Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 6–
10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (demonstrating how landlords can find ways
around VAWA protections via loopholes); see also Jennings v. Hous. Auth., No.
WDQ-13-2164, 2014 WL 346641 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2014) (showing how judges’
interpretations and lawyer mistakes allow VAWA protections to be ineffective).
258. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (serving as an
example of a state statute that provides housing protection for domestic violence
victims with private leases).
259. See, e.g., id. (protecting domestic violence victims when trying to
terminate a private lease early to escape an abuser).
260. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 70, at 1864 (noting that
“[e]arly-termination statutes provide victims with the assurance that
negotiations lack, in addition to offering a palatable alternative to enduring more
abuse,” but still not all states have statutes and the states that do have statutes
are not all alike).
261. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (articulating the police powers).
262. See, e.g., § 38-12-402 (demonstrating a state legislature’s exercise of its
police power to draft legislation protecting domestic violence victims with housing
concerns).
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power is the authority of government to adopt and enforce
measures to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare” of state citizens.263 “[T]o the extent that the exercise of the
police power is reasonable and has a real relationship to a
legitimate governmental purpose, it has been held not to infringe
constitutional rights despite some incidental interference with
individual rights.”264 Some state courts have properly recognized a
state’s ability to enact statutes that specifically protect domestic
violence victims in private leases.265 In particular, these courts
have recognized that “authorizing exclusion of perpetrators of
domestic violence from the residences of their victims is
reasonable, and it has a real relationship to the purpose of
protecting victims of domestic violence from further harm.”266 “The
protection of victims of domestic violence from further harm has as
its purpose the protection of the public welfare, which is a proper
exercise of the police power . . . .”267
With this police power, over the past ten years many states
have begun to enact statutes that protect domestic violence victims
who hold private leases.268 When ratifying its own protective
statute in 2004, the Washington state legislature publicly
acknowledged the policy reasons for “facilitat[ing] escape options
for domestic violence victims . . . [to] allow[] victims to terminate
residential leases without penalty.”269 The state legislature
recognized the public safety aspect at risk by explaining that it
“[found] that victims of these crimes who do not have access to safe
housing are more likely to remain in or return to abusive or
dangerous situations . . . . The legislature further [found] that
evidence that a prospective tenant has been a victim of domestic
263. Calicoat v. Calicoat, No. o8CA32, 2009 WL 3683665, at *12 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 6, 2009) (quoting State v. Martin, 151 N.E.2d 7 (Ohio 1958)).
264. Id.
265. See id (explaining that state legislatures are granted the power to protect
their citizens general welfare).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1876 (noting then that “Oregon,
Washington, Colorado, North Carolina, and Texas have laws that allow domestic
violence victims to terminate a rental agreement without financial penalty,” but
now many more states do).
269. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Serv., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 133 (Wash. 2008).
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violence . . . is not relevant to the decision whether to rent to that
prospective tenant.”270 While this acknowledgment is a step in the
right direction compared to when the only protective statute was
VAWA and when only a few states had protective statutes, still not
all states have statutes.271 The statutes that do exist are
inconsistent when juxtaposed, therefore they confuse judges and
victims who reside in multiple states.272
B. Existing State Statutes
Thirty-one states have enacted statutes that allow domestic
violence victims to terminate their private leases early in order to
escape abusive situations.273 While most statutes have similar
provisions, the failure of other states to include certain provisions
limits the protections available to the victims in those states.274 For
example, some state statutes, such as Nevada’s, include a specific
definition of “domestic violence” in their lease termination
provision, putting the term into context.275 Not all states—Arizona
is one example—include definitions that relate specifically to lease
terminations, thereby creating ambiguity and confusion.276 Some
states, including Texas, have promulgated highly detailed
provisions that cover protections for victims, landlords, and
members of the public who might be involved, such as other
tenants in the building or complex.277 This last group of statutes
270. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 45.
271. See State Laws, supra note 25.
272. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (exemplifying
one state statute with protective provisions that are not reflected in all state
statutes, but also fails to include protective measures that other statutes have).
273. See State Laws, supra note 25 (listing which states have protective
statutes).
274. See State Laws, supra note 25 (detailing the similarities and differences
of state statutes).
275. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing definitions
of certain terms that appear in the statute as they relate to the statute).
276. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1318 (2018) (failing to include definitions
of terms as they relate specifically to the statute).
277. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016 (West 2010) (including provisions
that allow landlord to evict or collect from tenants if necessary and unrelated to
the tenant’s status as a victim, while also protecting victims and others who live
in the same apartment complex).
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provides the most clarity for judges and allows a decision that is
more acceptable to all of the involved parties.278 For instance,
several provisions address the question of whether the tenant or
the landlord retains the security deposit when the lease is
terminated.279 Courts have been inconsistent in their
determination of who gets the deposit, but some statutes, such as
North Dakota’s, provide clarification of who should receive it in
certain circumstances.280
The Washington state statute includes an actual template of
a letter that a tenant can send to the landlord explaining that the
tenant is a victim of domestic violence and would like to terminate
the lease early.281 In this uncommon approach, a victim can simply
fill out the form with his or her name and information.282 Because
it is included in the state statute, a court would have to accept such
a letter as valid.283 The form letter helps victims because it is a
quick and easy way to inform their landlords of their desire to
terminate their lease.284 Many tenants would have difficulty
preparing an acceptable letter themselves.285

278. See Johnson, supra note 70 (providing how state statutes help judges
understand how to properly adjudicate cases).
279. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (addressing how
different situations can lead to either the landlord or the tenant receiving the
security deposit after the lease is terminated early); see also N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 47-16-17.1 (West 2017) (addressing different landlord and tenant
contractual situations).
280. See § 47-16-17.1 (clarifying when a tenant versus a landlord gets to keep
the security deposit); see also § 38-12-402 (stating when a tenant, not the
landlord, keeps the security deposit); Turner v. 1212 S. Mich. P’ship, 355 Ill. App.
3d 885, 887 (2005) (addressing the question directly of who should get the security
deposit in certain situations, as different ordinances confuse the question in
court).
281. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (providing a template
of a form a tenant can share with his or her landlord to terminate a lease early).
282. See id. (detailing what information should be included in the letter).
283. See id. (including areas where the drafter can fill in the blank as well as
describing what the drafter should write so that a landlord must accept it and
terminate a lease).
284. See id. (describing the rationale behind providing a template of a form
letter).
285. See id. (explaining what information is necessary, such as what the
incident was, who the parties were, and when the incident occurred).
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In contrast, some statutes are far too narrow and fail to
include protections that most other statutes provide.286 For
example, the New Jersey statute is unique in its brevity at one
page long.287 It also fails to include protections for victims who have
temporary, thirty-day protective orders.288 Other statutes protect
victims with temporary protective orders, which is important
because many more women seek temporary orders than
permanent ones, especially if they have children with the
abuser.289
C. What If a State Lacks a Protective Statute?
Thirteen states lack protective statutes all together, including
Montana, Idaho, Kansas, and Mississippi.290 Without any
statutory directive or guidance, courts can rule as they see fit,
sometimes leaving a victim in a dangerous situation.291 For
example, in 2008 a domestic violence victim in Ohio brought suit
against her landlord for refusing to simply move her to another
unit in the same apartment complex so that her abuser would not
know where she lived.292 Ohio does not have a protective statute at
all so the decision was left up to the judge.293

286. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6 (West 2008) (failing to include a template,
discussion about security deposits, or protections for tenants with ex parte
orders).
287. See id. (exemplifying a statute that is only a page long).
288. See id. (providing only a minimally protective provision).
289. See Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52 (explaining how many
women who are granted temporary protective orders do not follow through with
training to be granted a permanent protective order because of time, effort, and
fear).
290. See State Laws, supra note 25 (detailing which states do not have
protective statutes).
291. See Robinson v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 1:08-CV-238, 2008
WL 1924255, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2008) (reflecting on the effects of a state
lacking a protective statute).
292. See id. at *1 (“As a result of the abuse and the threat to her life, Plaintiff
has requested that the CMHA transfer her to another unit or scattered site
dwelling so that Mr. Davis will not be able to find her and will not be able to
continue to be a threat to her well being.”).
293. See id. at *7 (reflecting an adjudicated case not reliant on an available
statute).
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In that case, Yolanda Robinson lived in an apartment with her
two children, but chose to leave when her then-boyfriend began
abusing her.294 Robinson’s ex-boyfriend began to abuse her a few
months after they started dating.295 Ultimately, Robinson’s
ex-boyfriend forced his way into her apartment and beat her,
causing significant physical damage to her body and the home.296
He fled the scene after threatening to come back and kill her, which
is why she and her children were afraid to stay there.297 After the
incident, Robinson filed a police report and was granted an
emergency ex parte temporary protective order.298 She also asked
her landlord to transfer her and her children to another available
unit so that they could escape the abuse and hide from the
perpetrator.299 The landlord refused and claimed that transfers for
this reason were not in their policy.300 The court ruled in favor of
the landlord for several reasons that violate VAWA, other state
statutes, and public policy.301 The court determined that the
landlord had not wronged Robinson because she was not evicted.302
“Although the Plaintiff has good reason to seek shelter, the fact is
that the Plaintiff is choosing not to return to her home for reasons
294. See id. at *1 (“Until recently, she lived at the same location with her two
children. She still pays rent and utilities for this unit. However, she has not lived
there since January 14, 2008, because at that time she was subjected to
significant and traumatic abuse by her former boyfriend.”).
295. See id. (articulating Mr. Davis’ abuse).
296. See id. (“Mr. Davis came to Plaintiff’s home, forced his way in and
severely beat her. This attack caused significant injuries to Plaintiff and also
caused property damage to the home.”).
297. See id. (“Since that time, Plaintiff and her children have been living with
friends and family. Plaintiff and her children are afraid to return to the residence
because Mr. Davis has threatened to come back and kill Plaintiff.”).
298. See id. (“Ms. Robinson, the Plaintiff, has filed a police report and was
granted an ex parte Civil Stalking and Sexually Oriented Offense Protection
Order.”).
299. See id. (“As a result of the abuse and the threat to her life, Plaintiff has
requested that the CMHA transfer her to another unit or scattered site dwelling
so that Mr. Davis will not be able to find her and will not be able to continue to be
a threat . . . .”).
300. See id. (“CMHA has declined to transfer Plaintiff because its policy does
not provide for transfers on the basis that a tenant has been a victim of domestic
violence.”).
301. Id.
302. See id. (“CMHA has not taken any steps to evict Plaintiff from her home
or otherwise affect her federal housing subsidy. Her unit is still her unit.”).
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unrelated to the services provided to her by the [Metro Housing
Authority].”303 The court also noted that the landlord did not cause
the domestic violence and therefore should not have to move her.304
Robinson and her two children had to rely on friends and family to
stay with while still paying rent at an apartment they could not
live in because their lives were in danger.305
The court’s holding ultimately disregards human dignity by
determining that if a landlord does not have a specific policy that
allows a tenant to be moved if she is a domestic violence victim,
then the victim has no hope of transfer and safety.306 It is equitable,
though, that a landlord can transfer a victim to another unit if one
is available in the absence of a specific policy encouraging
transfer.307 Robinson was left paying rent for an apartment she
could not safely reside in while, alternatively, the landlord could
likely have moved Robinson to another similar unit and still
receive a rent check, all while supporting the tenant’s needs.308
“Plaintiff claims that the harm she has or may suffer far outweighs
any harm that may be suffered by the CMHA or any other party.
She claims that she is homeless and will remain homeless unless
she is granted a transfer.”309 The judge felt as though affording
Robinson this protection was a job for law enforcement and not one
with which the landlord had to concern himself.310 The court ruled
that “[i]t is not the responsibility of the housing authority to
protect its tenants from all potential crime, including domestic
303. Id. at *5.
304. See id. at *4 (“When compared with domestic violence, the initial
placement of the tenant is not a causative factor of the domestic violence.”).
305. See id. at *6 (“The Court is not insensitive to the Plaintiff’s situation and
the turmoil she has faced due to the violent acts of Mr. Davis. . . . [H]owever, the
status of the law does not require the CMHA to grant her a transfer on the basis
of a threat of future domestic violence.”).
306. See id. (emphasizing the lack of policy, statute, or law requiring a victim
to be transferred if she requires proper protocol).
307. See id. (concluding that the lack of a clear indication that the victim must
be moved translates to her inability to be moved, failing to consider that the judge
could ask the landlord to move the tenant for policy reasons, even though no
statute requires the landlord move her).
308. Id.
309. Id. at *5.
310. See id. (“To do so would essentially place CMHA in the role of law
enforcement and make them a guarantor of their tenants’ safety.”).
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violence.”311 The court determined that protecting Robinson would
“be discouraging to private landlords who make their properties
available” and therefore landlords should be able to deny a
suffering tenant a safe place to live.312
This case justifies the need for state protective statutes
because some judges hold that, absent directly applicable statutory
or regulatory language, they lack the authority to grant a victim
protection regarding housing.313 In this case the court determined
that “[u]nfortunately . . . the status of the law does not require the
[landlord] to grant [Robinson] a transfer on the basis of a threat of
future domestic violence.”314 All states must enact legislation to
protect victims because without declarative law, victims are too
easily ignored and their lives are often at risk if they are not
granted the help they request.315 An easily adaptable model statute
for states without such laws would generally simplify and speed up
passage of legislation to ameliorate living circumstances for many
domestic violence victims.316
V. Proposed Model Universal Statute
A universal statute for all states to adopt could resolve the
ambiguities and gaps in protection that currently exist. VAWA is
insufficient to protect all domestic violence victims’ housing
concerns because it only applies to federally subsidized housing.317
Victims with private leases are also still not adequately protected
in many states.318 For example, Illinois courts have struggled to
311. Id.
312. Id. at *6.
313. See id. (determining to not provide the victim with protection because
the landlord had no policy to move domestic violence victims and Ohio does not
have an applicable statute).
314. Id.
315. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1860 (explaining the “necessity and
legitimacy of state laws that provide domestic violence victims with the right to
terminate a rental agreement without penalty in order to escape abuse.”).
316. See generally infra Appendix (outlining a model statute).
317. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No.
113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013) (explaining what the act protects).
318. See Sara Olkon, Tenant Reported Abuse—Then Suffered Eviction, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 13, 2009, at A1 (“The federal [VAWA] of 2005 protects victims who live
in public or subsidized housing from eviction because of . . . violence, experts say,
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award security deposits to domestic violence victims because the
state lacks a provision clarifying whether the security deposit
accrues to the tenant or landlord.319 Regarding the case of a
Michigan woman who attempted to terminate her lease early for
the purpose of escaping an abusive situation and wished to retain
her security deposit, the court determined that “[a]lthough the
Lease specifically provided for a ‘Termination Fee’ in the amount
of $1,892.00 [ ], due to Mrs. Turner’s circumstances, I agreed to
allowing Plaintiffs to prematurely terminate the Lease, in
exchange for Plaintiffs’ agreement to forfeit their $1,046.00
security deposit [ ], and any interest accrued thereon [ ].”320 There
is inconsistency in court holdings because some states include
security deposit provisions in their statutes and others do not.321
This creates uncertainty regarding case law for victims and
lawyers who are attempting to seek return of a security deposit.322
Courts have complained about the lack of clarifying law.323 For
example, in a case regarding a victim denied housing, the court felt
as though it did not have enough guidance to adjudicate the case
fairly.324 “Under these circumstances, pending further
development of the legal and factual record, the court believes it is
appropriate to decline to rule whether plaintiff has a right of
action, enforceable under § 1983, pursuant to the provisions of
VAWA as incorporated in the Housing Act of 1937.”325 The model

but the law is hazier when it comes to private landlords. Advocates say a lack of
clear protection creates a disincentive for . . . women to seek help.”).
319. See Turner v. 1212 S. Mich. P’ship, 355 Ill. App. 3d 885, 888 (2005) (“1212
argued that it had agreed to permit Adriane Turner to terminate her lease early,
but only on the condition that she forfeit her security deposit.”).
320. Id.
321. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (addressing how
different situations can lead to either the landlord or the tenant receiving the
security deposit after the lease is terminated early); see also N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 47-16-17.1 (West 2017) (same).
322. See § 38-12-402 (addressing how different situations can lead to either
the landlord or the tenant receiving the security deposit after the lease is
terminated early); see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-16-17.1 (West 2017)
(same).
323. See Meister v. Kansas City, No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887, at *5
(D. Kan. 2011) (addressing the lack of law in this area).
324. See id. (complaining of the lack of applicable law).
325. Id.
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universal statute in the Appendix is designed to fill existing gaps
in the law and render greater guidance to the courts.326
A. Elements of Model Universal Statute
The model statute provides five key elements to help judges,
victims, and landlords understand the law.327 The model statute
incorporates different effective aspects of various state laws, such
as Nevada’s definition section and Washington’s lease termination
letter template, as well as originally developed provisions.328
First, the model statute includes an extensive definition
section.329 It articulates what certain terms mean when addressed
within the context of the statute.330 Borrowing from Nevada’s early
lease termination statute, terms such as “domestic violence” and
“harassment” would have a specific meaning in the context of the
statute and those lengthy definitions can be found in other sections
of the model statute.331 The definition section adds clarity for the
reader and resolves any ambiguity or potential for
misunderstanding terminology.332
Second, the statute clearly outlines how a domestic violence
victim can terminate a lease.333 It explains what paperwork must
be delivered to the landlord for him or her to grant an early lease
termination, the proper method of delivery, and how the
paperwork should be presented.334 Of note, adopted from the
326. See generally infra Appendix (outlining a model universal statute).
327. See generally infra Appendix (outlining a model universal statute).
328. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (incorporating term
definitions); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (offering a
template for letters tenants can send to their landlords).
329. See infra Appendix, ¶ 2 (providing definitions for terms used in the
statute).
330. See infra Appendix, ¶ 2 (providing definitions for terms used in the
statute).
331. See § 118A.345 (citing to different portions of the law to shorten the early
lease termination statute).
332. See infra Appendix, ¶ 2 (defining eight terms used within the model
universal statute).
333. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 1, 3, 4 (describing the procedure for terminating
one’s lease).
334. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 3–4 (outling the proper paperwork and procedure
for delivering the paperwork).

WHERE IS HOME?

327

Washington statute, the model statute includes a template of a
letter a victim can fill out to give to his or her landlord that clearly
articulates the abuse with a sufficient amount of information for a
judge to accept it.335 This information further reduces ambiguity
and allows landlords to understand what information they need in
order to grant the early termination of a lease.336
Third, the model statute addresses the landlord’s role in the
victim’s future ability to find housing. It details what the landlord
can and cannot disclose to future landlords. It also forbids
landlords from providing negative letters of reference for victims
who needed to terminate their leases early for safety reasons.
Landlords frequently discriminate against domestic violence
victims because of their status as victims. Provisions of VAWA and
this model statute would help to curtail that discrimination.
Elements of these provisions were adopted from existing statutes,
such as Colorado’s.337
Fourth, the model statute addresses concerns about damages
to the home and which party retains the security deposit after a
lease is terminated early.338 Oftentimes judges are uncertain about
which party should be awarded the security deposit.339 In many
cases, the victim is left paying for damages he or she did not
inflict.340 This statute clarifies under what circumstances the
landlord receives the security deposit and when the tenant does. It
also provides that the perpetrator of the abuse is liable for damages

335. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (including a letter
template).
336. See infra Appendix, ¶ 3 (outlining a template letter).
337. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (including provisions
protecting domestic violence victims from future landlord discrimination).
338. See infra Appendix, ¶ 6 (“If the tenant or cotenant has paid a security
deposit, the deposit must not be withheld for the early termination of the rental
agreement if the rental agreement is terminated pursuant to this section.”).
339. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-16-17.1 (West 2017) (stating that the
security deposit must be paid to the lessee subject to some conditions); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (stating that the landlord is not
obligated to refund the security deposit to the tenant unless certain conditions
are met).
340. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 1:08-CV-238,
2008 WL 1924255, at *1, *2, *6 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2008) (denying Ms. Robinson’s
motion to transfer and concluding Ms. Robinson was still liable for the apartment
and any subsequent damage).
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to the home when that person inflicted such damage.341 As noted
in cases cited above, which party retains the security deposit is a
common cause for concern.342 This model statute should provide
clarity for judges, landlords, and tenants in the future when
contemplating that question.343 Elements of the provision were
adopted from the Kentucky statute.344
Fifth, the model statute addresses privacy concerns.345 Under
the statute, a landlord cannot disclose information about the
victim to the perpetrator.346 It also allows the landlord or victim to
change the locks on the home or to have the landlord transfer the
tenant to a similar available unit.347 The victim’s safety is the
primary concern.348 This statute includes various provisions
adopted from state statutes, such as Washington’s, as well as
original concepts like transferring tenant leases to other similar
apartment units for the purpose of providing the victim with a
different address, protecting the victim as fully as possible.349
The model statute offers clarity and resolves ambiguities in
existing laws.350 If adopted universally, all judges, tenants, and
landlords would more easily understand their abilities and rights.
341. See infra Appendix, ¶ 7 (“A person who is named as the adverse party
may be civilly liable for all economic losses incurred by the
landlord . . . including, . . . costs for repair for any damages . . . .”).
342. See Turner v. 1212 S. Mich. P’ship, 355 Ill. App. 3d 885, 887 (2005)
(addressing the question directly of who should get the security deposit in certain
situations).
343. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 6–7 (clarifying who receives the security deposit
and who is liable for damages).
344. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.300 (West 2017) (addressing who gets the
security deposit in different situations).
345. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 8–10 (codifying the landlord’s obligation to keep
certain information confidential).
346. See infra Appendix, ¶ 8 (“A landlord shall not provide to an adverse party
any information concerning the whereabouts of a tenant, cotenant or household
member if the tenant or cotenant provided notice pursuant to subsection 1.”).
347. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 12–14 (delineating a landlord’s obligation to
install new locks or transfer the tenant to another available unit).
348. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 12–14 (addressing that each of these remedies is
to allow the victim to escape the domestic violence, harassment, sexual assault,
or stalking).
349. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (including a lockchange provision).
350. See generally infra Appendix (addressing ambiguities related to security
deposits, damages, and how victims terminate their leases).
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The statute includes protections for victims, landlords, and the
public.351 Therefore, while landlords will likely claim that they will
endure an undue burden of voiding contracts with tenants, that
the statute is a slippery slope toward allowing non-victims to claim
domestic violence as a means of excusing themselves from
contractual obligation under a lease, and that they may bear
undue expense as a result of an early lease termination, this
statute resolves those concerns by including landlord
protections.352 For example, the statute only requires landlords to
transfer tenants within a building or complex if another
comparable unit is available.353 It ensures the landlord does not
have to make extra efforts to transfer a victim or lose a higher rent
for a more expensive unit.354 The statute also requires that tenants
provide supportive evidence of abuse, including protective orders
and police reports.355 Therefore, not just anyone can claim abuse to
terminate a lease early.356 Finally, the statute includes provisions
explaining when tenants have to pay landlords, when an adverse
party has to pay, and when the landlord is not liable, providing
confirmation that the landlord will not be harmed.
VI. Conclusion
Public policy supports protecting women and men from
domestic violence.357 Our society and government have taken steps
351.
See generally infra Appendix (delineating a statute that considers the
interests of the victims, the landlords, and the public).
352. See H.R. Rep. No. 2EHB-1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004) (articulating landlord
qualms with early termination statutes).
353. See infra Appendix, ¶ 14 (“A landlord must agree to transfer a tenant to
another available unit in the complex if an apartment of the same rental price is
available . . . .”).
354. See infra Appendix, ¶ 14 (requiring a landlord to transfer a tenant only
if there is another available unit of the same rental price in the apartment
complex).
355. See infra Appendix, ¶ 3 (mandating that the tenant provide the landlord
with a copy of an order for protection, a written report from a law enforcement
agency, or a written affidavit).
356. See infra Appendix, ¶ 3 (outlining the additional documents required for
a tenant to terminate their lease).
357. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 6, 7, 12, 17, 19 (explaining who is monetarily
responsible in certain situations).
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to protect victims and stop future violence by highlighting the
prominence and lasting dangers of domestic violence.358 VAWA
and protective state statutes are representations of the policy to
protect victims via housing law efforts.359 “Domestic violence
embodies an affront to victims’ human dignity . . . . In granting
victims a right to early termination, the law places victims’ human
dignity and what would otherwise constitute social inequality
above landlords’ economic interests.”360 VAWA and the statutes
that exist now are not enough to support this public-policy effort
and adequately protect domestic violence victims’ housing
concerns.361 A universal statute would likely be able to provide
general coverage to victims and resolve ambiguity regarding what
protections exist.362
Had a universal state statute existed, Caren Burnett would
have been able to more easily escape her husband’s abuse, not be
discriminated against when looking for future housing, and not be
financially burdened by losing a security deposit.363 Mrs. Burnett’s
experience is far too common, as thousands of women attempt to
escape situations of domestic violence daily.364 Thankfully, as the
years progress, more states are enacting protective statutes and
even some cities are enacting ordinances that allow domestic
358. See HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173 (articulating efforts to combat
domestic violence).
359. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th
Cong. (2013) (serving as the primary federal law protecting female victims of
domestic violence); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017)
(explaining the housing protection for domestic violence victims in Colorado).
360. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1875.
361. See Johnson, supra note 70 (addressing how more statutes are needed to
protect victims).
362. See infra Appendix (addressing many of the inconsistencies and gaps in
existing statutes).
363. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. June
15, 2012) (detailing the difficulties Mrs. Burnett faced when trying to leave her
husband).
364. See Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52 (explaining how on
average approximately ten men and women, many with their children, come into
the office daily to seek a protective order and escape from their abuser); see also
Joel L. Young, 5 Facts Everyone Must Know About Domestic Violence, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/when-youradult-child-breaks-your-heart/201510/5-facts-everyone-must-know-aboutdomestic (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“More than 200,000 phone calls are placed
to domestic violence hotlines every year.”) [https://perma.cc/4NZF-29PB].
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violence victims to terminate their leases early.365 While steps are
being taken to protect victims regarding their leases, the proposed
model statute could provide protection for virtually all victims
while resolving the challenge to courts, tenants, and landlords of
understanding the law.366 Ultimately, Mrs. Burnett and all victims
like her are in desperate need of a protective change¾their lives
depend on it.367

365. See Bill Turque, New KC Ordinance Lets Domestic Violence, Sexual
Assault Victims Break Leases, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 2, 2018, 4:36 PM)
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article215974365.html
(last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“Victims of domestic violence, sexual assault or
stalking will be able to terminate a lease without penalties from a landlord, under
an ordinance passed Thursday by the Kansas City Council.”)
[https://perma.cc/3CE8-L2H5].
366. See infra Appendix (providing actions for victims and landlords to take
to remedy particular scenarios and addressing inconsistencies within the law).
367. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. June
15, 2012) (explaining the harmful emotional abuse Mrs. Burnett suffered).
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1. If a tenant, cotenant, or household member is the victim of
domestic violence, harassment, sexual assault, or stalking, the
tenant or any cotenant may terminate the rental agreement by
giving the landlord written notice of termination effective at
the end of the current rental period or 30 days after the notice
is provided to the landlord, whichever occurs sooner.368
2. As used in this section:
(a) “Adverse party” means a person who is named in an order
for protection against domestic violence, harassment, sexual
assault, or stalking, a written report from a law enforcement
agency, or a written statement from a qualified third party and
who is alleged to be the cause of the early termination of a
rental agreement pursuant to this section.
(b) “Cotenant” means a tenant who, pursuant to a rental
agreement, is entitled to occupy a dwelling that another tenant
is also entitled to occupy pursuant to the same rental
agreement.
(c) “Domestic violence” means the commission of any act
described in _______ portion of the statute.369
(d) “Harassment” means a violation of ____________________.370
(e) “Household member” means any person who is related by
blood or marriage and is actually residing with a tenant or
cotenant.
(f) “Qualified third party” means:
(1) A physician licensed to practice in this State;
(2) A psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine in this State
and certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology, Inc. or the American Osteopathic Board of
Neurology and Psychiatry of the American Osteopathic
Association;
(3) A psychologist licensed to practice in this State;
(4) A social worker licensed to practice in this State;
368. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing sample text
to be used for a statute).
369. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.485 (West 2018) (providing a sample
definition of “domestic violence”).
370. See id. § 200.571 (providing a sample definition of “harassment”).
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(5) A registered nurse holding a master’s degree in the field
of psychiatric nursing and licensed to practice professional
nursing in this State;
(6) A marriage and family therapist or clinical professional
counselor licensed to practice in this State;
(7) Any person who:
(I) Is employed by an agency or service which advises
persons regarding domestic violence or refers them to
persons or agencies where their request and needs
can be met and who is licensed to provide health care,
or is a member of the board of directors or serves as
the executive director of an agency or service which
advises persons regarding domestic violence or refers
them to persons or agencies where their request and
needs can be met;
(II) Has received training relating to domestic
violence; and
(III) Is a resident of this State; or
(8) Any member of the clergy of a church or religious society
or denomination that is recognized as exempt under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §
501 (c)(3), who has been chosen, elected or appointed in
conformity with the constitution, canons, rites, regulations
or discipline of the church or religious society or
denomination and who is a resident of this State.
(g) “Sexual assault” means a violation of _________________.371
(h) “Stalking” means a violation of ______________________.372
3. In the case of a termination of a rental agreement pursuant to
this section on the grounds that a tenant, cotenant, or
household member is a victim of domestic violence, the written
notice provided to a landlord pursuant to subsection 1 must be
delivered by mail, email, or in person and must describe the
reason for the termination of the rental agreement and be
accompanied by:
(a) A copy of an order for protection, either temporary or
permanent, against domestic violence issued to the tenant,

371.
372.

See id. § 200.366 (providing a sample definition of “sexual assault”).
See id. § 200.575 (providing a sample definition of “stalking”).
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cotenant, or household member who is the victim of domestic
violence;
(b) A copy of a written report from a law enforcement agency
indicating that the tenant, cotenant, or household member
notified the law enforcement agency of the domestic violence;
or
(c) A copy of a written affidavit in the form prescribed below and
signed by a qualified third party acting in his or her official
capacity stating that the tenant, cotenant, or household member is
a victim of domestic violence and identifying the adverse party.
(I) The record of the report to a qualified third party may be
accomplished by completion of a form provided by the qualified
third party, in substantially the following form:
________________________________________
Name of organization, agency, clinic, professional service
provider
I and/or my [household member] am/is a victim of
__ domestic violence as defined above.
__ sexual assault as defined above.
__ stalking as defined above.
__ unlawful harassment as defined above.
Briefly describe the incident of domestic violence, sexual
assault, unlawful harassment, or stalking:
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
The incident(s) that I rely on in support of this declaration
occurred on the following date(s) and time(s) and at the
following location(s):
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
The incident(s) that I rely on in support of this declaration
were committed by the following person(s):
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_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
I state under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of
[state name] that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated at
[city], this ___ day of _______ 20___.
________________________________________
Signature of Tenant or Household Member
I verify that I have provided to the person whose signature
appears above the statutes and that the individual was a
victim of an act that constitutes a crime of domestic violence,
sexual assault, unlawful harassment, or stalking, and that the
individual informed me of the name of the alleged perpetrator
of the act. Dated this ___day of _______, 20___
________________________________________
Signature of authorized officer/employee of (organization,
agency, clinic, professional service provider.373
4. In the case of a termination of a rental agreement pursuant to
this section on the grounds that a tenant, cotenant, or
household member is a victim of harassment, sexual assault,
or stalking, the written notice provided to a landlord pursuant
to subsection 1 must describe the reason for the termination of
the rental agreement and be accompanied by:
(a) A copy of a written report from a law enforcement agency
indicating that the tenant, cotenant, or household member
notified the law enforcement agency of the harassment, sexual
assault, or stalking, as applicable; or
(b) A copy of a temporary or extended protective order, as
applicable.374
5. A tenant or cotenant may terminate a rental agreement
pursuant to this section only if the actions, events, or
circumstances that resulted in the tenant, cotenant, or
household member becoming a victim of domestic violence,
harassment, sexual assault, or stalking occurred within the 90

373.
form).
374.
text).

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (providing a sample
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing sample
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days immediately preceding the written notice of termination
to the landlord.375
6. A tenant or cotenant who terminates a rental agreement
pursuant to this section is only liable, if solely or jointly liable
for purposes of the rental agreement, for any rent owed or
required to be paid through the date of termination and any
other outstanding obligations. If the tenant or cotenant has
prepaid rent that would apply for the rental period in which the
rental agreement is terminated, the landlord may retain the
prepaid rent and no refund is due to the tenant or cotenant
unless the amount of the prepaid rent exceeds what is owed for
that rental period. If the tenant or cotenant has paid a security
deposit, the deposit must not be withheld for the early
termination of the rental agreement if the rental agreement is
terminated pursuant to this section.376
7. (a) A person who is named as the adverse party may be civilly
liable for all economic losses incurred by a landlord for the early
termination of a rental agreement pursuant to this section,
including, without limitation, unpaid rent, fees relating to
early termination, costs for the repair of any damages to the
dwelling, and any reductions in or waivers of rent previously
extended to the tenant or cotenant who terminates the rental
agreement pursuant to this section.
(b) The tenant must not be liable for the adverse party’s crimes
or property damage.377
8. A landlord shall not provide to an adverse party any
information concerning the whereabouts of a tenant, cotenant,
or household member if the tenant or cotenant provided notice
pursuant to subsection 1.378
9. If a tenant to a residential rental agreement or lease agreement
notifies the landlord that the tenant is a victim of unlawful
sexual behavior, stalking, domestic violence, or domestic abuse,
the landlord shall not disclose such fact to any person except
with the consent of the victim or as the landlord may be
required to do so by law.379
375.
376.
377.
text).
378.
379.
text).

See id. (providing sample text).
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.300 (West 2017) (providing sample text).
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing sample
See id. (providing sample text).
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (providing sample
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10. If a tenant to a residential rental agreement or lease agreement
terminates his or her lease pursuant to this section because he
or she is a victim of unlawful sexual behavior, stalking,
domestic violence, or domestic abuse, and the tenant provides
the landlord with a new address, the landlord shall not disclose
such address to any person except with the consent of the
victim or as the landlord may be required to do so by law.380
11. A person may not refuse to rent, refuse to negotiate for the
rental of, or in any other manner make unavailable or deny a
dwelling to an individual, or otherwise retaliate or discriminate
in the rental of a dwelling solely because a tenant or applicant
or a household member of the tenant or applicant exercised the
right to terminate a lease under this section.381
12. If a tenant or cotenant provided notice pursuant to subsection
1, the tenant, the cotenant, or a household member may require
the landlord to install a new lock onto the dwelling if the
tenant, cotenant, or household member pays the cost of
installing the new lock. A landlord complies with the
requirements of this subsection by:
(a) Rekeying the lock if the lock is in good working condition;
or
(b) Replacing the entire locking mechanism with a new locking
mechanism of equal or superior quality.382
13. A landlord who installs a new lock pursuant to subsection 8
may retain a copy of the new key. Notwithstanding any
provision in a rental agreement to the contrary, the landlord
shall:
(a) Refuse to provide a key which unlocks the new lock to an
adverse party.
(b) Refuse to provide to an adverse party, whether or not that
party is a tenant, cotenant, or household member, access to the
dwelling to reclaim property unless a law enforcement officer
is present.383
14. A landlord must agree to transfer a tenant to another available
unit in the complex if a unit of the same rental price is
available, merely transferring the existing lease to another
380.
381.
382.
text).
383.

Id.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-23 (2018) (providing sample text).
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing sample
See id. (providing sample text).
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similar unit for the purpose of escaping domestic violence,
harassment, sexual assault, or stalking.
15. This section shall not be construed to limit a landlord’s right to
terminate a rental agreement for reasons unrelated to domestic
violence, harassment, sexual assault, or stalking.384
16. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the termination of
a rental agreement pursuant to this section:
(a) Must not be disclosed, described, or characterized as an
early termination by a current landlord to a prospective
landlord; and
(b) Is not required to be disclosed as an early termination by a
tenant or cotenant to a prospective landlord.385
17. If a tenant does not vacate the leased premises within 30 days
of providing to the landlord the written notice required, the
landlord is entitled to rent from the tenant and can terminate
the lease after 60 days.386
18. A landlord is immune from civil liability if the landlord in good
faith acts in accordance with this section.387
19. A landlord who violates this section not in good fail is liable to
the tenant for actual damages, civil penalty equal in amount to
the amount of one month’s rent plus $500, and attorney’s
fees.388
20. A tenant’s right to terminate a lease before the end of the lease
term, vacate the dwelling, and avoid liability under this section
may not be waived by a tenant. 389

384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id.
Id.
See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016 (West 2010) (providing sample text).
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.300 (West 2017) (providing sample text).
PROP. § 92.016.
Id.

